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ABSTRACT 
As business environments become more complex, with varying degrees of 
uncertainty, organizations must become more entrepreneurial in order to identify 
emerging and new opportunities for sustained superior performance. Several factors 
can promote/enhance corporate entrepreneurship within organizations. 
This research study examined the role of compensation practices in the process of 
elevating employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour. Drawing on the agency theory, 
hypotheses relating actual and desired compensation practices to elevated 
employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour were empirically examined among different 
employees from various organizations. The moderating role of department‘s risk 
control on the relationship between desired compensation practices and elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour was also examined. 
Empirical data were collected from 209 respondents in different organizations via a 
survey questionnaire. The measures included actual compensation practices, 
desired compensation practices, actual intrapreneurial behaviour, elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour, and department‘s risk control. The main analytical 
techniques used in this study were t-test for dependent/related groups, canonical 
correlation and moderation regression analyses. 
The findings of this study indicated that non-monetary compensation practices were 
the best predictors of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour and that department‘s risk 
control did not moderate this relationship. However, it is unknown how the selection 
of industries will affect this study‘s findings.  
In addition, desired compensation practices explained only 25% of the variance in 
elevated intrapreneurial behaviour, suggesting that compensation systems are not 
enough to elevate employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour. Compensation systems 
should be an integral part of an overall entrepreneurial strategy of an organization.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Human capital is a critical resource to most organizations while human resource 
management is used by managers to integrate the actions of employees to keep 
their behaviour congruent with the interests of the organization (Liao, 2005:294). 
Organizations have recognized that the human resource function has a direct impact 
on bottom line results and therefore understanding how this relationship works is 
very crucial. With increasing and aggressive competition, most business leaders 
agree that employees are perhaps the only truly sustainable source of competitive 
advantage; as such, efficient management of human capital may be the ultimate 
determinant of organizational performance (Liao, 2005). 
 
In the bid to understand how human resource management impacts organizational 
performance, several constructs like business strategy and corporate 
entrepreneurship have been used (Liao, 2005). The human resource management 
practice that this study focuses on is ―compensation.‖ Contingency theory holds that 
human resource management practices are determined by the kind of business 
strategy an organization follows. It assumes that organizations which coordinate their 
business strategy with human resource management practices perform better than 
organizations which do not (Liao, 2005:295). Thus, it is crucial for an organization to 
coordinate its compensation practices with its strategic objectives in order to secure 
a competitive advantage and support the desired behaviour from its employees 
(Lerner, Azulay, and Tishler, 2009:53). Compensation practices enable organizations 
to translate their general and long-term dimensions of strategy into the specific and 
daily actions of employees (Lerner et al, 2009). 
 
In addition, corporate entrepreneurship can be studied at various levels, the most 
important levels being the organizational and the individual/employee level (Antoncic 
and Hisrich, 2003:8). This study seeks to understand corporate entrepreneurship at 
employee level (intrapreneurship).  To examine intrapreneurship, the employee‘s 
intrapreneurial behaviour (innovation, proactiveness, and risk-taking) will be 
measured. Only employees from entry to managerial level will be included in the 
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sample. Executives and directors will not form part of the respondents used for data 
analysis.  
 
Sexton and Camp (1993) recognized that a compensation system that promotes 
innovation is one of the main organizational factors believed to enhance 
intrapreneurial behaviour within the organization. In the presence of such a 
compensation system, employees tend to become more innovative, more proactive, 
and are willing to take risks leading to a general increase in employees‘ 
intrapreneurial behaviour. Thus, if top management believes that enhancing 
employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour will contribute to fulfilling the organization‘s 
goals, then they need to ensure a compensation system which will promote 
innovation (Lerner et al, 2009:54). 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study  
 
While the relationship between compensation and innovation has been extensively 
documented (Hayton, 2005:25), this study seeks to extend this relationship by 
examining the relationship between desired compensation practices and elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour. According to Lerner et al (2009), intrapreneurial 
employees prefer/desire outcome-based compensation practices which refers to 
those which are directly linked to success of the intrapreneur‘s idea/initiative/new 
venture; for example, options in new venture equity, variable bonuses for milestones 
achieved, and so on. 
 
In addition, the moderating effect of department‘s risk control on the above 
mentioned relationship is examined. Department‘s risk control refers to how the 
employee‘s current department manages risk. The following are the main objectives 
for this study ranked from the most integrative to the more specific objective: 
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 To conduct a general literature review on three constructs, namely 
compensation practice, intrapreneurship, and risk control.  
 To conduct a literature review on the agency theory and use it as the 
theoretical foundation to establish a link between compensation, 
intrapreneurial behaviour, and risk. 
 To combine relevant items from previous research instruments and use them 
to create reliable scales for the quantitative measurement of compensation 
practices, intrapreneurial behaviour, and risk control. 
 More specifically, to empirically analyze the role of desired compensation 
practices in elevating employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour and how the 
perception of their department‘s risk control moderates this relationship. 
 
1.2 Research questions and hypotheses  
 
Based on previous research pertaining to the above-mentioned objectives, the 
following research questions are raised: 
 
(1) What is the relationship between actual compensation practices and employees‘ 
elevated intrapreneurial behaviour? 
(2) What is the relationship between desired compensation practices and employees‘ 
elevated intrapreneurial behaviour?  
(3) Does risk control have an effect on the relationship between desired 
compensation practices and employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour? 
 
From the above questions, the following relevant hypotheses are formulated: 
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Hypothesis 1 (null): Actual compensation practices are not positively related to 
employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. 
Hypothesis 1 (alternate): Actual compensation practices are positively related to 
employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (null): Desired compensation practices are not positively related to 
employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. Intrapreneurial employees 
prefer/desire outcome-based compensation practices which refers to those which 
are directly linked to success of the intrapreneur‘s idea/initiative/new venture; for 
example, options in new venture equity and variable bonuses for milestones 
achieved.  
Hypothesis 2 (alternate): Desired compensation practices are positively related to 
employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. Intrapreneurial employees 
prefer/desire outcome-based compensation practices which refers to those which 
are directly linked to success of the intrapreneur‘s idea/initiative/new venture; for 
example, options in new venture equity and variable bonuses for milestones 
achieved. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (null): Department‘s risk control does not moderate the relationship 
between desired compensation practices and employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour. 
Hypothesis 3 (alternate): Department‘s risk control moderates the relationship 
between desired compensation practices and employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour. 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 Actual compensation practices (ACP) = independent variables (IV). 
 Desired compensation practices (DCP) = independent variables (IV). 
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 Employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour (EEIB) = dependent variable 
(DV). 
 Department‘s risk control (DRC) * DCP = interaction variable.  
 
1.3 Context of the study  
 
A wide scope of different disciplines was consulted for the conceptual foundations of 
this study. This study reflects mostly parts of human resource management and 
corporate entrepreneurship.  Consequently, to reflect suitable subject breadth is 
quite challenging. Literature in entrepreneurship, human resource management, 
organizational behaviour, and other fields was investigated for a general overview of 
concepts, constructs, and operational definitions that were appropriately linked to the 
study objectives. It is important to base variables on the conceptually and 
theoretically sound foundations of other disciplines as this helps increase the 
intellectual legitimacy of entrepreneurship. 
 
Findings regarding the influence of compensation practices on innovative 
performance have existed for many years (Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia, 
2000; Balkin and Bannister, 1993; Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1984). However, most 
of these studies have focused on compensation availability and not on the specific 
types of compensation that may better promote innovative performance (Lerner et al, 
2009:54). That being the case, this research serves to examine those compensation 
practices believed to be most relevant in enhancing employee‘s intrapreneurial 
behaviour, without situating the study within any specific context that may explain 
intrapreneurial behaviour. Such contextual factors include  the organization‘s 
entrepreneurial culture and industry. 
 
This study is situated within the South African private sector or business environment 
which is the main driver of economic development in the country. In South Africa, the 
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private sector is dynamic and is predominantly owned by South African citizens 
whose rights are entrenched constitutionally (Mbeki, 2004). Employees in South 
Africa‘s private sector are organized into independent social movements, especially 
trade unions, which articulate and represent their interests. Central to these interests 
is the issue of job creation, an expectation to be met by private sector owners as 
they seek to maximize profit in their various businesses (Mbeki, 2004). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship literature suggests that employees in organizations 
doing business in turbulent, hostile, and dynamic environments, will exhibit higher 
levels of intrapreneurial behaviour than those in more stable environments 
(Scheepers, Bloom, and Hough, 2008:2). Even though the South African business 
environment has been characterized by turbulence over the past few decades, South 
Africa still ranks very low (unweighted average = 1.4) on the established business 
ownership rate according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor report (Bosma and 
Levie, 2009:21). In addition, between 2004 and 2009, South Africa had one of the 
lowest ―high-growth expectation early-stage entrepreneurship‖ (Bosma and Levie, 
2009:29). On the issue of corporate entrepreneurship, organizations like Discovery 
South Africa have managed to develop a corporate entrepreneurial culture but this is 
not yet a common phenomenon within the South African business environment. The 
organizational dilemma is how to motivate employees to behave intrapreneurially 
and this research attempts to address this dilemma. 
 
1.4 Problem statement  
 
The main characteristics of intrapreneurial employees include innovation, 
proactiveness, and risk-taking. Innovation is one of the most widely studied aspects 
of corporate entrepreneurship from a human resource management perspective. Of 
all the human resource management practices, the influence of compensation 
practices on innovative performance has received the most attention (Hayton, 2005; 
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Balkin et al., 2000).  However, in South Africa, organizations find it difficult to 
motivate their employees to behave intrapreneurially. 
 
1.5 Significance of the study  
 
Although much research has been done regarding the influence of compensation 
practices on innovative performance, the main focus has been on executives and on 
compensation availability rather than the desired types of compensation that may 
better promote innovation (Lerner et al, 2009:54). In addition, the effect of 
uncertainty on the compensation-innovation relationship has not been clearly 
addressed (Hayton, 2005:25). Changes in environmental complexity and 
organizational stability may alter an employee‘s perception of uncertainty which 
might impact an employee‘s involvement in intrapreneurial activities within the 
organization (Hayton, 2005).  
 
Most studies of the compensation-innovation relationship have been conducted in 
developed countries like the United States of America. Such studies reveal little 
knowledge emerging from an efficiency-driven economy like South Africa which 
shows differences in innovative behaviour, risk profile, compensation practices, and 
culture (Bosma and Levie, 2009:5). Traditional compensation practices as they exist 
at present might be insufficient to motivate employees to behave intrapreneurially 
especially when we take into consideration the degree of uncertainty in the South 
African work environment and private sector. Therefore, understanding the 
relationship between compensation practices and employees‘ intrapreneurial 
behaviour, and the effect the level of risk has on this relationship is crucial to the 
long-term promotion of intrapreneurship within South African organizations. This 
research attempts to fill this gap by examining the types of compensation practices 
that can more effectively elevate employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour within South 
African organizations. Also, considerations of uncertainty acceptance by employees 
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will be explored by measuring the moderating effect of department‘s risk control on 
the DCP - EEIB relationship. 
 
Furthermore, this study seeks to provide guidance to South African organizations on 
what compensation practices they can use to elevate their employees‘ 
intrapreneurial behaviour. By elevating employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour, South 
African organizations will become more productive and thereby favourably compete 
with their counterparts in developed countries. 
 
1.6 Definition of terms  
 
The recognition of entrepreneurial activities within existing organizations is rapidly 
increasing but ambiguities continue to plague attempts to define such activities 
(Sharma and Chrisman, 1999:13). Some of the terms that have been used to 
describe corporate entrepreneurship include corporate venturing, strategic renewal, 
and intrapreneurship. Table 1 presents a list of some existing definitions for 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
Table 1: Existing definitions (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999:14-15) 
Author/s and year Definition suggested 
Guth and Ginsberg 
(1990:5) 
Corporate entrepreneurship encompasses two types of phenomena and the 
processes surrounding them: (1) the birth of new businesses within existing 
organizations, that is, internal innovation or venturing; and (2) the transformation of 
organizations through renewal of the key ideas on which they are built, that is, 
strategic renewal. 
Jennings and Lumpkin 
(1989:489) 
Corporate entrepreneurship is defined as the extent to which new products and/or 
new markets are developed. An organization is entrepreneurial if it develops a 
higher than average number of new products and/or new markets. 
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Table 1 continued 
Author/s and year Definition suggested 
Zajac, Golden, and Shortell (1991:171) Internal corporate venturing involves the creation of an 
internally-staffed venture unit that is semi-autonomous, 
with the sponsoring organization maintaining ultimate 
authority. 
Pinchot III (1985:ix) Intrapreneurs are any of the ―dreamers who do.‖ Those 
who take hands-on responsibility for creating 
innovation of any kind within an organization.  
Nielson, Peters, and Hisrich (1985:181) Intrapreneurship is the development within a large 
organization of internal markets and relatively small 
and independent units designed to create, internally 
test-market, and expand improved and/or innovative 
staff services, technologies or practices within the 
organization. This is different from the large 
organization entrepreneurship/venture units whose 
purpose is to develop profitable positions in external 
markets. 
Guth and Ginsburg (1990:6) Strategic renewal involves the creation of new wealth 
through new combinations of resources. 
Damanpour (1991:556) Corporate innovation is a very broad concept which 
includes the generation, development and 
implementation of new ideas or behaviours. An 
innovation can be a product or service, an 
administrative system, or a new plan or program 
pertaining to organizational members. 
Jennings and Young (1990:55) Corporate entrepreneurship is the process of 
developing new products or new markets. An 
organization is entrepreneurial if it develops a higher 
than average number of new products or new markets 
within that industry. 
Jones and Butler (1992:734) Internal corporate entrepreneurship refers to 
entrepreneurial behaviour within one organization. 
Hornsby, Naffziger, Kuratko, and Montagno (1993:30) Venture may be applied to the development of new 
business endeavours within the corporate framework. 
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According to the literature, the difference between corporate entrepreneurship and 
intrapreneurship is just a matter of definition (Jong and Wennekers, 2008). Corporate 
entrepreneurship is usually defined at the organizational level while intrapreneurship 
relates to the individual level (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). To this effect, corporate 
entrepreneurship is defined as a top-down process (from executives down to the 
individual employees), while intrapreneurship is a bottom-up process (proactive and 
innovative initiatives of individual employees to either improve work procedures or 
explore and exploit business opportunities) (Jong and Wennekers, 2008). 
 
1.7 Assumptions 
 
The following assumptions were made: 
 Observations were independent as very few responses came from 
respondents in the same organization. This is very important because if many 
respondents originated from the same organization, their responses on 
compensation practices are likely to be the same and thus will distort the pool 
of results from other respondents. 
 Respondents had enough knowledge in the area of compensation and 
intrapreneurship to enable them respond to the questions in the 
questionnaire.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Scholarly literature on compensation, innovation, intrapreneurship, and risk control is 
substantial. A general literature review on compensation, intrapreneurship, and risk 
control is offered in this chapter. Since the theoretical foundation of the proposed 
hypotheses is positioned in the agency theory, a review of some important 
conceptual issues regarding the agency theory is discussed. Nonetheless, it remains 
beyond the scope of this section to systematically delineate the entire reach of the 
agency theory. Other theoretical foundations that will be discussed in this literature 
review include the resource-based and expectancy theories. 
 
This literature review is divided into four major sections (compensation practices, 
intrapreneurship, risk control, and theoretical framework and hypotheses 
development) and a conclusion. The theoretical framework section discusses the 
resource-based, expectancy, and agency theories.  It ends with the statement of the 
three hypotheses formulated for this research. 
 
2.2 Compensation practices 
 
Compensation practices can be located in the broader field of human resource 
management practices. Following that idea, this section will begin by reviewing some 
of the theories about human resource management. 
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2.2.1 Theory about human resource management  
 
There are three main categories of theories namely strategic, descriptive, and 
normative (Guest, 1997:264). These theories examine human resource management 
practices in general.  
 
2.2.1.1 Strategic theories of human resource management 
 
These theories are mainly concerned with the impact of external contingencies on 
human resource management policy and practice (Guest, 1987). In a way, human 
resource management becomes the dependent variable. Hendry and Pettigrew 
(1990:26) classified the main environmental influences on human resource 
management in order to lay out a perspective on human resource management. 
They mapped out two contexts (one within the organization and the other in the 
wider environment) and investigated how these contexts impacted human resource 
management. There was no specific analysis of any link to performance even though 
this link was implied. In their view, human resource management is characterized by 
its closer alignment with business strategy and this view is in opposition with Guest 
(1987), who believes that the distinctive strategic direction pursued is what 
distinguishes human resource management and not the adoption of a strategic view. 
Other studies done in the United States of America support the view of Hendry and 
Pettigrew (1990) by hypothesizing that organizations with a fit between business 
strategy and human resource management practices will have superior performance 
(Guest, 1999). 
 
2.2.1.2 Descriptive theories of human resource management 
 
These theories provide no clear path for any analysis on the relationship between 
human resource management and performance because they describe the human 
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resource management field in a broad way (Guest, 1999:265). The best studies in 
this area attempted to address some interrelationships in the broad field of human 
resource management. Being too general implies such studies are useful in 
identifying a range of outcomes of interest to various stakeholders but provide no 
specific recommendations (Guest, 1999). 
 
2.2.1.3 Normative theories of human resource management 
 
These theories are prescriptive in their approach, meaning there is a sufficient body 
of knowledge to provide a basis for prescribed best practice. For example, Guest 
(1987:512) posits that applying an integrated set of human resource management 
practices with a view to achieving the normative goals of high commitment to the 
organization will result in higher employee performance. Normative theories focus on 
the internal characteristics of human resource management to the neglect of broader 
strategic issues. This is a limitation because in ignoring business strategies and 
advocating a set of best practices, there is a risk of implying one best way. Another 
problem is that human resource management goals can be well defined but the list 
of human resource management practices is not quite clear and awaits more 
empirical research (Guest, 1997). 
 
Finally, the descriptive and normative theories describe human resource 
management policy and practice in a way that is potentially helpful for measurement 
even though they are not sufficient. Therefore a sufficient theoretical basis for 
classifying human resource management policy and practice is still lacking and this 
problem is clearly identified in the empirical literature (Guest, 1999). The strategic 
and descriptive theories suggest that there is a link between human resource 
management practice and organizational performance. This link is explored in the 
next section. 
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2.2.2 Human resource management and performance: Theoretical framework 
 
The strategic and descriptive model suggests that superior performance is likely to 
be attained when the various human resource management practices are aligned to 
support each other; the right people will be in the right places doing the right things 
(Guest, 1997:268). In contrast, the normative theory is rooted in an organization‘s 
psychology and is built on lower-range more specific behavioural theories. The 
assumption is that employees‘ motivation and commitment are enhanced by 
―appropriate‖ human resource management practices. The factors which constitute 
these appropriate practices stem from specific behavioural theories of organizational 
commitment, job design, goal setting, and much more. Human resource 
management provides a coherent integration of these behavioural theories and 
makes apparent the linkages between human resource management practices and 
performance (Guest, 1997). Human resource management practices are many and 
the next section identifies some of these practices and where they are situated in 
current research. 
 
2.2.3 Human resource management practices 
 
Human resource management practices are valuable to an organization because 
they help the organization a great deal in accomplishing its objectives. 
Consequently, an organization should invest in human resource to guarantee 
increasing success (Kaya, 2006). Previous research has shown that sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage and internal competitiveness emanate from those 
resources that are rare, inimitable, and valuable. Human resource is one of such 
resources (Barney, 1991). Sun, Aryee, and Law (2007:560) classified selective 
staffing, extensive training, internal mobility, employment security, clear job 
description, results-oriented appraisal, incentive reward (compensation), and 
participation as high performance human resource practices. These are coherent 
practices that improve the skills of the workforce, participation in decision making, 
and motivate the workforce to put forth discretionary effort. Ultimately, they result in 
 26 
superior organizational performance in the areas where the workforce has direct 
control. This best practice approach has dominated research studying the effects of 
high-performance human resource management practices on organizational 
performance, but there is recognition that this relationship may be contingent on an 
organization‘s contextual condition (Sun et al, 2007). 
 
The high performance human resource management practice in this research is 
incentive reward or compensation. Properly designed compensation systems 
promote desirable employee behaviour which is crucial to the successful 
implementation of business strategies (Yanadori and Marler, 2006:559). Therefore, a 
good fit between an organization‘s business strategy and its compensation practices 
should lead to improved effectiveness in the organization, suggesting that 
organizations should design compensation systems which suit their business 
strategies (Yanadori and Marler, 2006). With regards to this study, an organization‘s 
strategic intention to promote intrapreneurial behaviour among its employees will 
succeed only if the compensation practices desired by its employees are 
implemented and these compensation practices should vary across different 
industries (Chandler, Keller, and Lyon, 2000).  
 
Yanadori and Marler (2006:559) explored the concept of strategic employee groups. 
In other words, if some employee groups are strategically more important than 
others, then organizations may choose to develop compensation systems that 
consider these differing strategic contributions. For example, some researchers 
regard research and development employees in high-technology organizations as 
strategic employee groups because their contributions directly enhance the 
organization‘s innovative capabilities (Yanadori and Marler, 2006).  
 
2.2.4 Human resource management and corporate entrepreneurship 
Human resource management systems and practices play an important role in the 
current state of development of corporate entrepreneurship (Edralin, 2010:29). In this 
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light, Edralin (2010) found that the human resource management practices of 
recruitment, selection, training and development, compensation, performance 
management, and employee relations all drive corporate entrepreneurship to an 
extent, with the latter being the most significant driver of corporate entrepreneurship. 
Organizations have realized that human capital is a critical resource and so they 
must partner with their employees to ensure profitability, sustainability, and global 
competitiveness. Employees who have the ability to pursue value-creating 
opportunities define whether an organization is entrepreneurial or not. This reliance 
of an organization‘s entrepreneurial capabilities on the behaviour of certain 
employees emphasizes the relevance of human resource management practices to 
corporate entrepreneurship (Edralin, 2010). 
 
2.2.5 Compensation practices and corporate entrepreneurship 
 
According to Sharma and Chrisman (1999:14), corporate entrepreneurship is the 
process where an employee or group of employees, in association with an existing 
organization, create a new business or innovate within that organization. The 
literature on corporate entrepreneurship reports that compensation practices are one 
of the vital structural dimensions promoting innovation and corporate 
entrepreneurship (Gautam and Verma, 1997). This is consistent with results from 
Chandler et al (2000:61) which suggest that management support and compensation 
practices promote commitment to innovate on the part of employees. Their argument 
was based on two premises: compensation practices can either be used as a tool to 
increase innovative activity or it can discourage innovative activity by rewarding other 
behaviours. Due to the impact rewards have on intrapreneurial behaviour, they are 
now seen as part of the organizational environment for fostering corporate 
entrepreneurship (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Montagno, 1999) and increasing 
performance by intrapreneurs (Jennings and Lumpkin, 1989).   
 
The need for appropriate incentive plans has been stressed by Lerner et al (2009:54) 
and this is consistent with Pinchot (1987) who claims that it is necessary to reduce 
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barriers and increase the compensation for intrapreneurs in order to identify and 
keep them in the organization. Intrapreneurs desire performance incentives as a 
form of feedback (Block and Ornati, 1987). Similar results were obtained in small 
businesses where most intrapreneurs were dissatisfied with the almost total lack of 
any extrinsic reward acknowledging the value of their contributions (Carrier, 1996). 
They believed that symbolic recognition was only sufficient in the short run but 
insufficient in the long run to make intrapreneurs remain committed to their initiatives, 
particularly considering the attendant risks (Block and Ornati, 1987). 
 
From the above studies, it is clear that there is a broad agreement regarding the role 
of compensation in corporate entrepreneurship, yet the empirical results are mixed. 
For example, some studies on the relationship between various types of financial 
compensation and the intrapreneur‘s performance did not find a positive relationship 
between the two (Lerner et al, 2009). Block and Ornati (1987) found no significant 
difference in performance among organizations that adopted special compensation 
practices for intrapreneurs while Sathe (1985) found that organizations which provide 
huge pay incentives are not more successful at motivating their employees to greater 
levels of intrapreneurship.  
 
Rather, innovative organizations used protection from failure as the primary incentive 
to motivate their employees to greater levels of intrapreneurship (Jennings and 
Lumpkin, 1989; Sathe, 1985). Some researchers who examined desired 
compensation practices, found a positive relationship between equity in the 
organization or venture and corporate entrepreneurship (Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999; 
Brazeal, 1993; Zahra, 1991). Brazeal (1993) noted that creativity should be rewarded 
by both financial and non-financial incentives. However, Rule and Irwin (1988) found 
that the freedom to implement the entrepreneurial idea was more important than 
financial rewards. 
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2.2.6 Compensation in organizations with a research and development 
laboratory 
 
According to Lerner and Wulf (2007:634), research and development expenditures 
have long been understood to play a major role in economic growth. In the twentieth 
century, the central corporate research and development laboratory was a dominant 
feature of the innovation landscape. These campus-like facilities employed 
thousands of researchers, many of whom were free to engage in the pursuit of 
fundamental science with little direct commercial applicability. The most notable of 
these research facilities included the Bell laboratories and the IBM central research 
facility. However, due to the disappointing commercial returns of most of these 
facilities and the intensified competitive pressures that came with them, 
organizations began to de-emphasize central research facilities in favor of divisional 
laboratories. Thus, compensation of central research personnel became closely 
linked to the economic objectives of the organization (Lerner and Wulf, 2007).  
 
Corporate research and development heads have better information regarding a 
project‘s potential, so they are charged with the role of allocating funds across the 
different projects. Such responsibilities present the temptation of making decisions 
that might increase private benefits at the expense of shareholders, such as funding 
of ―pet projects‖ (Lerner and Wulf, 2007). In order to mitigate this problem, 
organizations use mostly long-term compensation (such as restricted stock and 
stock options) to align the interests of corporate research and development heads 
with those of shareholders. Lerner and Wulf (2007:641) found that in organizations 
with a centralized research and development department, long-term compensation 
granted to corporate research and development heads was positively associated 
with innovation while little association was found between short-term compensation 
for corporate research and development heads and innovation. However, this finding 
was not supported in organizations with decentralized research and development 
divisions as little association was found between long-term compensation for 
corporate research and development heads and innovation. One support for this 
finding is the fact that corporate research and development heads in centralized 
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organizations (that is, organizations that conduct research only at the corporate 
level) have more influence over research and development decisions relative to 
those in decentralized organizations (Lerner and Wulf, 2007).  
 
Some major compensation problems occur in research and development (Zenger 
and Lazzarini, 2004). Innovation is a process of discovering new combinations of 
knowledge and the research and development engineer‘s ability, effort, and 
knowledge are the necessary inputs in this process. However, organizations face 
severe problems in contractually obtaining these inputs both before and after hiring. 
Before hiring, organizations face huge problems in accurately assessing the 
applicant‘s capacity to innovate, solve problems, and perform tasks (Zenger and 
Lazzarini, 2004). Some organizations use indicators like educational achievement 
and job history to provide valuable correlates of the desired job attributes, but such 
measures only provide a crude level of sorting. Self-reports are generally unreliable 
while former employers are unwilling to disclose information about former employees 
because of potential legal consequences, and that being the case, it is quite difficult 
to identify which engineers to employ. It is because of such difficulties that employers 
craft compensation systems that induce talented engineers to self-select to their 
organizations (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004:330).  
 
After hiring, the engineers get to work and begin to learn new things while 
developing ideas and skills that are valuable, both internally and externally (Zenger 
and Lazzarini, 2004). Retaining these engineers becomes necessary because when 
they leave for another organization, they take with them such ideas, skills, and 
whatever they have learned in their current organization. This results in a loss of 
knowledge assets to their current organization. One way to retain their services is to 
design and implement optimal compensation systems that can motivate these 
engineers to remain. However, motivating engineers‘ effort on the job is quite 
problematic in itself because research and development engineers are engaged in 
tasks that are primarily cognitive. In this regard, it is difficult to discern the behaviours 
that reflect appropriate and high effort.  Given such difficulty, employers should 
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attempt to design and implement compensation systems that induce engineers to 
choose desired behaviours (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
 
2.2.7 Compensation and organizational size 
 
Where it is difficult to clearly recognize effort, ability, and knowledge among 
employees, such as the case of research and development engineers, performance-
contingent compensation can be used to lure talent and induce high effort. With such 
a system, employees take a portion of the performance gains that can arise from 
greater effort, ability, and knowledge (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004:331). This implies 
that as links between pay and performance increase, the incentives in luring ability 
and inducing greater effort become more effective; higher levels of incentive intensity 
increase the marginal gains from greater effort. 
 
In addition, the most valuable employees usually prefer contracts that aggressively 
reward contributions to performance (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). Aggressive 
performance-based contracts offer higher returns in comparison to contracts that pay 
a fixed amount reflecting some average level of performance .Therefore 
organizations that want top talent should increase incentive intensity in order to lure 
top talent from organizations that weakly reward performance. However, increasing 
incentive intensity is not simple. Some factors like the accuracy of performance 
measures and the control employees have over performance measures influence the 
intensity with which pay and performance are linked. While accurate performance 
measures minimize the measurement risk imposed by rewarding performance, they 
also impose risk on employees if factors beyond their control also alter performance. 
Thus, the optimal level of incentive intensity is influenced by the effectiveness with 
which agents control performance measures (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
Consistent with this logic, Zenger and Marshall (2000) found stronger links between 
pay and performance in organizations where there was a close link between easily 
measured outputs and individual actions. 
 32 
An organization‘s size also plays a role in incentive intensity. Small organizations 
grant some advantages in providing highly incentive-intensive compensation 
because they are able to offer higher-powered incentives merely by rewarding 
individuals for performing well (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). When compared to 
large organizations, fewer employees influence the performance of research and 
development in small organizations. This means that the performance of the entire 
research and development group is a performance indicator over which each 
employee has some reasonable amount of control. Such influence over performance 
measures enables small organizations to design and implement incentive-intensive 
rewards based simply on organizational performance. It is unreasonable to use this 
approach in a large organization but in a small organization of around 10 employees, 
such reward schemes are both effective and common place (Zenger and Lazzarini, 
2004:331). Zenger and Lazzarini (2004) found that in compensating engineers, small 
organizations had a larger percentage of pay contingent on organizational 
performance. 
 
Another attribute of small organizations is that it is easier to recognize and reward 
individual differences that contribute to organizational performance. Thus, it is less 
costly to measure these individual contributions in smaller organizations than larger 
ones (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004:331). Regarding performance assessments, small 
organizations have yet another important advantage over large ones. As 
performance assessments pass up the hierarchy, multiple layers of managers have 
incentives to potentially manipulate them and their accompanying reward allocations. 
Disputes usually arise among managers regarding the amount of pay increases they 
are willing to grant their subordinates. In small organizations, individual evaluations 
by senior managers are undistorted as there are no middle managers to manipulate 
them (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
 
In addition, Zenger and Marshall (2000:153) suggests that fairness considerations 
and comparison processes greatly constrain management‘s ability to aggressively 
reward individual and group performance in large organizations. Employees usually 
compare their pay and if they perceive inequity, they become de-motivated and 
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dissatisfied. This can lead to reduced effort and low turnover for the organization 
(Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). Also, some employees have perceptions of their own 
performance that are quite exaggerated. Such exaggerated self-perceptions can 
lead to employees‘ perceptions of inequity when organizations attempt to 
aggressively reward performance. As such, it is important to establish performance 
levels with a high degree of reliability and validity. Given the strong demand for 
fairness, large perceptual biases, and tendencies for inaccurate performance 
measurements, it becomes problematic to implement differential rewards based on 
performance (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
 
Sometimes management may attempt to justify differences in performance 
assessment and pay in order to avoid the consequences of reduced effort and low 
turnover. Such justification attempts are costly and unlikely to succeed (Zenger and 
Lazarrini, 2004). According to Zenger and Marshall (2000:153), the level of these 
comparison costs may be directly linked to an organization‘s size. For example, if an 
employee in a large organization is aggressively rewarded by management for 
positive contribution, a large number of other employees are likely to see this as 
inequitable leading to costs such as reduced morale, departure, reduced effort, and 
justification attempts by management.  
 
The magnitude of these costs depends on the number of employees who hear about 
individually differentiated reward allocations and thus, in a small organization, the 
negative fallout of any given perceived inequity is greatly reduced (Zenger and 
Lazzarini, 2004). Also, employees in small organizations can directly observe their 
colleague‘s performance, and thus performance differences among them are more 
likely to be shared knowledge. In large organizations on the other hand, employees 
often rely on evaluations made by management in comparing the performance of 
their colleagues. Therefore, relative to large organizations, small organizations have 
a higher level of measurement accuracy, greater control over performance 
measures, and reduced comparison problems which enable them to aggressively 
reward individual contributions to performance and correlates of performance. This is 
consistent with Zenger and Lazzarini (2004) who reported that small organizations 
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offer employment contracts that more aggressively reward individual contributions to 
performance and correlates of performance.  
 
Due to low level of measurement accuracy, lesser control over performance 
measures and increased comparison problems, large organizations often search for 
other pay mechanisms. According to Brown (1990), large organizations are more 
likely to implement merit pay systems than small organizations because in such 
systems, subjective merit ratings are linked to yearly increases in salary, and not the 
salary level itself. A typical merit pay system uses a rating scale in which employees 
are assigned five to seven performance categories which determine a range of 
acceptable yearly compensation increases. Job grade and the elapsed time within 
the job grade determine the magnitude of the assigned yearly increases within rating 
categories (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
 
Such systems are designed to promote consistency among employees because in 
theory, those of equal performance receive common ratings regardless of their 
supervisor (Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). In practice, it is difficult to individually 
differentiate performance or justify performance differences and this leads to very 
limited pay variance, except for extreme performers. Most employees fall in the one 
to two merit rating categories with corresponding little performance-based pay 
variance while few employees who are rated in the extreme high category receive 
significantly higher yearly increases (mostly through promotion). This limited pay 
variance renders seniority the main determinant of pay in large organizations with 
merit pay systems as supported by Zenger and Lazzarini (2004:339) who found that 
large organizations are more likely to use formal merit pay systems that aggressively 
reward seniority. However, this does not mean that high performers are happy with 
merit pay systems. In general, merit pay systems do not lure or induce high 
performers to perform. All the same, it is an approach that is procedurally fair with 
little opportunity to dispute pay, since seniority can be observed and measured easily 
(Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004). 
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2.2.8 Compensation and organizational culture 
 
Beyond their impact on current employees, compensation systems are thought to 
convey essential messages about an organization‘s culture, values, and practices to 
both current employees and potential hires (Kuhn, 2009:1634).  The most obvious 
link between pay system practice and organizational culture is performance-based 
pay. Such systems are mostly based on evaluations of individual performance, but 
rewards can also be determined at the level of the group. This is consistent with 
previous research findings on compensation practices which noted that most 
employees preferred their pay to be based on individual rather than group 
performance (Kuhn, 2009).  
 
According to findings from Kuhn and Yockey (2003), college students in the United 
States of America were more likely to choose performance-based pay over a fixed 
salary when income was based on individual performance rather than group 
performance. This finding, however, does not indicate whether different types of pay-
for-performance plans may influence an applicant‘s attraction via effects on 
perceptions of organizational culture. Kuhn (2009) used the cultural constructs 
individualism and collectivism, to provide a meaningful way to conceptualize 
organizational cultures. While collectivism is assessed by attributes like shared 
decision making and the perception that the organization takes care of its 
employees, individualism is associated with the perception that workers are 
encouraged to recognize their unique potential and that inter-employee competition 
is accepted. Kuhn (2009) found that, in a recruiting advertisement, describing bonus 
as being based on individual outcomes led to the organization‘s culture being 
perceived as relatively more individualistic. 
 
Another aspect of organizational culture deals with compensation systems and 
person-organization fit (Kuhn, 2009). Most researchers studying this phenomenon 
have used a needs-supplies approach that assesses the match between individual 
preferences and needs with the pay system. For example, Turban and Keon (1993) 
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studied pay raises with attention to seniority and individual performance in which 
they found that employees were attracted to pay raises based on individual 
performance than those based on seniority. This effect was moderated by the 
respondent‘s need for achievement.  
 
2.2.9 Executive compensation and innovation strategy 
 
The recent global and economic conditions have resulted in an increased need for 
organizations to focus on all organizational aspects necessary for effective strategy 
implementation (Wheatley and Doty, 2010:89). In the literature on strategy, 
organizations that establish a good fit between organizational attributes and their 
strategy are in a better position to implement that strategy and have performance 
advantages as well (Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Yanadori and Marler, 2006). In the 
current business world, environmental uncertainty is a common phenomenon and 
most organizations use increased innovation as one of the ways to compete within 
the competitive landscape (Damanpour, 1991).  
 
According to Wheatley and Doty (2010), a defining component of an innovation 
strategy is the organization‘s spending on research and development because, 
decisions about research and development spending are directly related to the 
implementation of an innovation strategy. In addition, executive compensation 
policies are likely to have a huge impact on the organization‘s research and 
development spending because, research and development spending is under the 
direct control of the chief executive officer and top management team (Wheatley and 
Doty, 2010). 
 
Decisions about research and development spending incorporate (either explicitly or 
implicitly) statements concerning risk preferences and organizational time horizons. 
These two interdependent constructs, as shown in the Table 2, represent many of 
the important differences between various forms of compensation. 
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 Table 2: Compensation time horizon and risk relationship (Wheatley and Doty, 
2010:91) 
 
 
Wheatley and Doty (2010) suggested that risk plays a crucial role in the 
compensation-performance relationship; if executives are not afraid of losing 
compensation based on performance, they may take on additional strategy risk. 
However, if their compensation is tied directly to organizational performance and a 
loss of compensation is possible, they are more likely to implement a less risky 
strategy. 
 
Base compensation is the basic cash that an employer provides for work performed 
and it is represented in the first quadrant as low risk, short-term (Table 2). Due to this 
low compensation risk, executives will be motivated to implement a higher-risk 
innovation strategy because of the potential of a high return in conformity with the 
high risk/high return definition of innovation strategy (Wheatley and Doty, 2010). 
Bonus is considered high-risk, short-term (second quadrant) because it ties 
compensation to short-term success. In order to capitalize on the bonus pay 
component, top management needs to meet specific short-term performance 
standards. Compared with base compensation, bonus has a higher risk in 
implementing a high-risk innovation strategy. This is because implementing an 
innovation strategy is a long-term endeavor. Thus, a short-term, results-based bonus 
will discourage executives from taking the long-term risk involved with innovation 
strategy (Wheatley and Doty, 2010).  
 
Options compensation, which is low-risk and long-term (third quadrant) is the most 
flexible for executives because an executive can choose between exercising and not 
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exercising the option. If the innovation is not successful, the strategic leadership can 
choose not to exercise the option and wait until the organization moves into a more 
favorable position. Such flexibility encourages risk-taking by top management and 
mitigates the inherent risk of an innovation strategy. The fourth quadrant  represents 
stock compensation which is high-risk and long-term (Wheatley and Doty, 2010).  
 
According to Beatty and Zajac (1994:330), increases in compensation risk leads to 
increases in top management‘s risk aversion. Implementing a high risk innovation 
strategy under such circumstances is a less likely event. With stocks, a specified 
level of performance is defined and if the strategic leadership meets or exceeds the 
target, they are compensated (this is similar to bonus compensation).  One major 
difference between stock and options is downside risk (Wheatley and Doty, 2010). 
Downside risk is always present with stocks because if the organization‘s stock 
begins to fall, the strategic leadership has no way of changing their compensation, 
unlike options where they could decide not to exercise the option. Thus, stock carries 
the most risk for executives involved with implementing a long-term innovation 
strategy (Wheatley and Doty, 2010).  
 
Stock compensation is mostly used to align the interests of top management with 
those of shareholders. Top management‘s fear of negatively affecting present 
shareholder value will deter them from taking what they perceive to be high-risk 
actions. Wheatley and Doty (2010) examined the importance of executive 
compensation (base, bonus, options, and stock compensation) for organizations 
implementing an innovation strategy. They found that bonus and options 
compensation moderated the innovation strategy-organizational performance 
relationship. More specifically, short- and long-term compensation had different 
driving mechanisms in the organization‘s decision-making with regard to strategy 
implementation. In today‘s organizations, pay-for-performance is very prevalent. 
Consistent with this practice, Wheatley and Doty (2010) found that high-percent 
bonus compensation (short-term) enhanced performance levels irrespective of the 
strategy risk involved. With respect to long-term compensation, their findings suggest 
that compensation can be tied directly to performance if low-risk strategies are being 
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implemented. Conversely, if high-risk strategies are being implemented, 
compensation should not be tied directly to performance (Wheatley and Doty, 2010).  
 
2.3 Intrapreneurship  
 
One of the ways to foster growth in a large or small business is to allow employees 
to introduce and implement innovation in the organization (Amo and Kolvereid, 
2005:7). According to Pinchot and Pellman (1999), intrapreneurs are employees who 
turn ideas into realities in an organization. Kuratko, Montagno, and Hornsby (1990) 
define intrapreneurship as an independent strategic behaviour by employees to 
exploit a given business opportunity. Carrier (1996) suggests that intrapreneurship 
and corporate entrepreneurship can be used as a method to stimulate innovation 
and utilize the creative energy of employees. Nonetheless, according to Hornsby, 
Kuratko, and Zahra (2002), there is still much to be learned about the substance and 
process of intrapreneurship.  
 
Innovation behaviour can be conceptualized as an initiative from employees 
concerning the introduction of new processes, new products, or new markets into an 
organization (Amo and Kolvereid, 2005). Even though there is a slight difference in 
the meaning of the terms corporate entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship, their 
desired result is innovation behaviour among employees (Amo and Kolvereid, 2005). 
Intrapreneurship is different from entrepreneurship in that while entrepreneurs 
innovate for themselves, intrapreneurs innovate on behalf of an existing organization 
(Carrier, 1996). 
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2.3.1 The concept of corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The concept of corporate entrepreneurship has also been described in the literature 
as corporate venturing or intrapreneurship (Brizek and Khan, 2008). Jennings and 
Young (1990) conceptualized corporate entrepreneurship as entrepreneurial efforts 
which require an organization‘s sanctions and resources for the purpose of carrying 
out innovative activities. Innovation is not possible without knowledge and therefore 
this view is also consistent with Floyd and Wooldridge (1999:132) who points out that 
corporate entrepreneurship relies on an organization‘s ability to learn by exploring 
new knowledge and exploiting existing knowledge. Such learning processes are 
dependent upon an organization‘s human and social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998) or an organization‘s strategic orientation through the regeneration of products, 
processes, and services (Covin and Miles, 1999). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship has also been defined as a process of organizational 
renewal (Sathe, 1985) or as the ability to generate, develop, and implement new 
ideas through corporate innovation (Damanpour, 1991). Broadly speaking, 
entrepreneurship involves innovation which eventually triggers an entrepreneurial 
event (Bygrave, 1993) and this can occur within an organization or in a start-up 
context. Therefore, the context of entrepreneurship as an organizational 
phenomenon needs attention in order to generate consistency in methodology and 
findings. In an attempt to fulfill this goal, entrepreneurial activity based on activities 
pursued independently is called ―independent entrepreneurship‖ while 
entrepreneurial activity based on activities pursued within an organization is called 
―corporate entrepreneurship‖ (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999).  
 
Two distinctive and separate arenas comprise corporate entrepreneurship. They 
include corporate venturing (Zajac, Golden, and Shortell 1990) and strategic renewal 
(Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). The activities associated with both types refer to an 
organization‘s efforts to revitalize, renew, or transform its strategy and structure, all 
in a bid to improve its performance. Sustained regeneration, where an organization 
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introduces a new product or enters a new but existing market, has also been coined 
as one form of corporate entrepreneurship (Covin and Miles, 1999). 
 
2.3.2 Corporate entrepreneurship and the corporate entrepreneur 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship focuses on how companies stimulate innovation, 
enterprise, and initiative from their employees and the subsequent contribution of 
individual behaviour to organizational success (Amo and Kolvereid, 2005). Hornsby 
et al (2002) regard corporate entrepreneurship as a strategy for the development 
and implementation of new ideas while Dess, Lumpkin, and McGee (1999) define 
corporate entrepreneurship as the transformation of organizations through strategic 
renewal. These definitions shows one of the interesting themes in corporate 
entrepreneurship research – how strategy should be designed in order to fit the 
organization‘s present needs and future visions (Amo and Kolvereid, 2005:9). Amo 
and Kolvereid (2005) found that a strategic orientation toward corporate 
entrepreneurship was significantly positively related to innovation behaviour, 
supporting the notion that organizations should put a corporate entrepreneurship 
strategy in place in order to promote innovation behaviour among their employees. 
Corporate entrepreneurship is initiated from the top. Thus, top management is 
delegated to give name and content to the initiative and assign members, 
responsibilities, and resources to the group (Amo and Kolvereid, 2002).  
 
Kanter (1984) found that the environment, rather than the individual determines an 
employee‘s involvement in innovative activity. She suggests that an organizational 
environment which stimulates employees to act is an environment which gives them 
the power to act. The degree to which the opportunity to use power is given or 
withheld from employees is one characteristic difference between organizations 
which stagnate and those which innovate (Kanter, 1984). In other words, companies 
which encourage innovation provide the freedom to act which arouses the desire to 
act. What matters to the potential corporate entrepreneur is how he or she perceives 
the organization‘s ability to encourage innovation. Most corporate entrepreneurs 
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have the ability to exercise skills in obtaining and using power in order to accomplish 
innovation (Amo and Kolvereid, 2005).  
 
While corporate entrepreneurs can find opportunities to innovate in almost any 
setting, more opportunities abound in specific domains that depend on the 
organization and its industry. The highest number of corporate entrepreneurial 
accomplishments are found in organizations that are least segmented or 
organizations that have integrative structures (Amo and Kolvereid, 2002:5). 
According to Kanter (1984), individual employees only take the initiative to innovate 
when the organization‘s environment supports innovation. Green, Brush, and Hart 
(1999) use a resource based approach to describe the corporate entrepreneur. They 
suggest that the corporate entrepreneur use his or her personal human and social 
resources to discover new business opportunities while leveraging support for the 
corporate entrepreneurial initiative. Kanter (1984) noted that the corporate 
entrepreneur is mostly a middle level manager and is found in every function. 
 
2.3.3 Intrapreneurship and the intrapreneur 
 
The literature on intrapreneurship focuses more on independent initiatives as 
intrapreneurs initiate the implementation of their innovations in a bottom-up way. 
Their innovations might not even be wanted by management initially (Carrrier, 1996). 
Intrapreneurs perform their roles and seek the corporation‘s blessing for their tasks 
afterwards (Pinchot and Pellman, 1999). An interesting research theme in the 
intrapreneurship literature examines how intrapreneurs overcome the resistance to 
their ideas from the surroundings. They gather resources from wherever they can 
and sponsors allocate resources based on both the intrapreneurial team‘s eagerness 
and the sponsor‘s faith in the intrapreneurial team (Pinchot and Pellman, 1999).   
 
An intrapreneur selects members for the intrapreneurial team according to their 
complementing knowledge base and their devotion to his/her vision. It is important 
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for the team to have a shared vision as it guides the activities of the team. Pinchot 
and Pellman (1999) suggest that every employee is capable of creativity. Thus, the 
shortage of intrapreneurs is mostly due to the lack of sponsors to protect and 
encourage intrapreneurs. While the intrapreneur is buried within nearly every 
employee, in most cases some training is needed to enable the employee to 
understand all the areas involved in conceiving, launching, and running a business. It 
is crucial to have experience, skills, or talents that are necessary to carry the 
intrapreneurial idea forward (Amo and Kolvereid, 2002:6).  
 
Intrapreneurs can learn from their failures and successes and use these experiences 
in their next intrapreneurial work. According to Pinchot (1985), there is no formula for 
determining who can become an intrapreneur –  employees become intrapreneurs 
when circumstances drive them to take initiative. Intrapreneurs tend to be young and 
highly educated. In addition, they are self-appointed to their tasks and are self-
determined goal setters who often take initiative to do things no one asked them to 
do (Pinchot 1985). Previous work experience and educational background of the 
intrapreneurs, as well as transferring employees across various organizational 
departments, promotes intrapreneurship as  potential intrapreneurs gain the ability to 
see a problem more holistically (Amo and Kolvereid, 2002). 
 
2.3.4 Proactivity 
 
Most organizations do not assess the personality qualities of either current or 
potential employees and it is important to recognize the influence individual 
differences have on innovative behaviour (Hornsby et al, 1993). Innovation 
behaviour in organizations is mostly due to initiatives from employees with an 
intrapreneurial personality.  
 
 According to Kanter (1984), intrapreneurship often involves collective work. 
Nevertheless, an organization needs employees who are willing to go their own way 
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and follow their own intuition. This observation is supported by Morris, Davis, and 
Allen (1994) who suggest that some parts of the intrapreneurial process could 
benefit from an individual leading and giving directions. To the individual, personality 
provides meaning, direction, and mobilization. Utsch, Rauch, Rothfufs, and Frese 
(1997) studied the differences between small scale entrepreneurs and managers in 
East-Germany and found that the differences were highest in need for achievement, 
self-efficacy, and control rejection. No difference in proactiveness was found 
between these two groups and the scholars just mentioned above claim the reason 
for this was because they did not operationalize proactivity well enough.  
 
According to Becherer and Mauer (1999), the definitions of proactivity and 
intrapreneurship have some parallels. Intrapreneurs are adept at getting others to 
agree to their private vision and they work within and around the system to 
accomplish their vision. This fits with proactive behaviour as it identifies individual 
differences among people to the extent in which they take action to influence their 
environments. Proactivity personality disposition was previously found to be related 
to entrepreneurial behaviour among small organization presidents (Becherer and 
Mauer, 1999).  
 
Jennings, Cox, and Cooper (1994) did a case-based investigation of differences and 
similarities between elite entrepreneurs and elite intrapreneurs and found that all 
their interviewees were highly proactive and responded to challenge. Antoncic and 
Hisrich (2000) measured proactivity as top managers‘ orientation in pursuing 
enhanced competitiveness and found that proactivity was an important aspect of 
intrapreneurship at an organizational level of analysis. Amo and Kolvereid (2002:9) 
used the Proactivity Personality Scale to examine whether there was a relationship 
between an individual‘s disposition toward proactive behaviour and intrapreneurship. 
The result indicated that proactive personality disposition was related to 
intrapreneurship but its influence was not as strong as the organization‘s influence 
on intrapreneurship. This suggests that an organization‘s strategy for 
intrapreneurship is also an important factor to consider. In support of this notion, 
Amo and Kolvereid (2005) found a significantly positive relationship between 
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intrapreneurial personality and innovation behaviour in organizations. Additionally, a 
model that combines strategic orientation toward corporate entrepreneurship and 
intrapreneurial intensity was found to promote innovation behaviour more than 
intrapreneurial personality as a standalone. This finding is further supported by 
Campbell (2000) who found that having employees with intrapreneurial personalities 
was pointless or even counterproductive unless a strategic orientation towards 
corporate entrepreneurship was in place.  
 
Another important suggestion from Amo and Kolvereid (2002) is that an employee‘s 
position could influence the level of intrapreneurship that the employee engages in. 
Kanter (1984) points out that freedom to act is one of the major factors that 
encourage the employee to contribute to innovation in the organization. The position 
held in the organization determines which empowerment level the employee has. 
Following this idea, senior management is more involved in intrapreneurship than 
middle management and middle management is more involved in intrapreneurship 
than junior management (Amo and Kolvereid, 2002). 
 
2.3.5 Manager’s emotions and intrapreneurship 
 
Recent scholars have argued that manager‘s emotions and their displays impact 
subordinate behaviour (Brundin, Patzelt, and Shepherd, 2008:222). Emotional 
displays to others are often involved in social interaction between individuals and can 
have a significant impact on other‘s behaviour. Thus, emotional displays of 
managers as they interact with employees influence the behaviour of the latter. 
Emotional display can be defined as an observable change in the face, voice, and 
activity level as perceived to reflect the observed individual‘s underlying emotions. 
Managers have the central task to motivate employees to behave in the interest of 
the organization. This means managers need to display the appropriate emotions 
depending on the actions they want employees to perform (Brundin et al, 2008). 
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According to findings from Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002), a manager‘s facial 
expression can have stronger effects on an employee‘s rating of the manager‘s 
leadership than the objective content of the delivered message. In addition, Pugh 
(2001) has shown that the emotional signal displayed by a sender can impact the 
receiver‘s behaviour by changing his or her emotional state. However, displayed 
emotions do not always reflect the ―real‖ emotions of the sender. For managers, this 
distinction provides the opportunity to display only those emotions which will make 
employees perform in line with organizational goals (Brundin et al, 2008). Basically, 
managers need to have the ability to control their emotions such that only those 
emotions which suit their purpose are displayed. Such ability reflects the manager‘s 
emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997).  
 
The impact of specific emotional displays on the receiver depends on the 
expectations he or she has about the sender. For example, service personnel show 
a friendly smile and good cheer to a customer while undertakers send a signal 
expressing sadness to a mourning person (Brundin et al, 2008:225). Sometimes, 
expectations of roles and expressed emotions may even vary within individuals as 
can be seen in the case of surgical nurses. They display little or neutral emotions in 
the operating room but warm and friendly feelings when dealing with patients and 
their relatives. Managers are supposed to act as motivators of entrepreneurial action 
among employees and their emotional displays can either enhance or diminish the 
willingness of employees to act intrapreneurially (Brundin et al, 2008).  
 
It is important to enhance employees‘ willingness to act intrapreneurially as this is 
essential for any organization to create new knowledge and transform it into 
marketable products and services (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This is crucial 
for many organizations as they operate in the hyper-competitive landscape of the 
21st century. In addition, responding to certain environmental conditions such as 
hostility and dynamism requires that organizations pursue an intrapreneurial strategy 
and engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Having employees with an 
entrepreneurial mindset enables the organization to identify new, uncertain, and high 
potential business opportunities.  
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A number of factors that can influence an individual‘s willingness to act 
entrepreneurially have been described in the literature on emotional motivation. 
Some of these include the individual‘s propensity to take risks, goal setting, and drive 
(Shane, Locke, and Collins, 2003). Brundin et al (2008) propose that a manager‘s 
displayed emotions about an entrepreneurial project provide certain signals to 
employees that influence the employee‘s perception of risk/uncertainty and the effort 
they are willing to invest. Furthermore, emotions can be contagious; hence 
managers‘ displayed emotions might motivate employees by influencing their 
emotional state.  
 
Brundin et al (2008) found that a manager‘s display of confidence and satisfaction 
about an entrepreneurial project increased an employee‘s willingness to act 
entrepreneurially, while a manager‘s display of frustration, worry, and bewilderment 
decreased an employee‘s willingness to act entrepreneurially. In addition, they found 
that displayed satisfaction enhanced the positive relationship between manager‘s 
displayed confidence and the employee‘s willingness to act, while manager‘s display 
of worry and bewilderment diminished this relationship. 
 
2.3.6 Antecedents of intrapreneurship 
 
Two main antecedents have been identified in the literature on intrapreneurship: the 
external environment of the organization and the characteristics of the organization 
(Antoncic, 2007). 
 
Some researchers have viewed the external environment as a determinant of 
entrepreneurial activity at the organizational level (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 
1991:262). Environmental characteristics like dynamism, technological opportunities, 
industry growth, and demand for new products are viewed as favorable for 
intrapreneurship whereas characteristics like unfavorable change and competitive 
rivalry are viewed as hostile (unfavorable). Environmental hostility can create threats 
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for the organization and thus stimulating the pursuit of intrapreneurship (Zahra, 
1991:263).  Dynamism is the perceived volatility and continuing changes in the 
organization‘s market. It is favorable to the pursuit of intrapreneurship because it 
tends to create opportunities in the organization‘s markets. Organizations operating 
in a high technological environment tend to adopt an entrepreneurial posture and the 
perception of growth markets can also pull organizations into increased 
intrapreneurial activities (Antoncic, 2007). Increased demand for new products 
creates an important demand-pull which can encourage intrapreneurship within the 
organization. Antoncic (2007) found that intrapreneurship in established 
organizations was positively impacted by environmental characteristics (increased 
dynamism, increased technological opportunities, industry growth, increased 
demand for new products, unfavorability of change, and increased competitive 
rivalry). 
 
Some characteristics of intra-organizational environments can serve as stimulants or 
impediments to intrapreneurship development (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2000; Pinchot, 
1985; Kanter, 1984). These intra-organizational characteristics include 
communication openness, control mechanisms, environmental scanning intensity, 
organizational values, and management support (Antoncic, 2007). Communication 
openness refers to information quality, quantity, and sharing. Open communication 
can also be used as a means to empower employees. Information sharing and 
empowerment are essential elements for innovation (Pinchot, 1985; Kanter, 1984), 
whereas information quality and quantity can be critical for successful intrapreneurial 
initiation and implementation (Zahra, 1991).  
 
Formal controls, when used in moderation to monitor intrapreneurial activities, can 
lead to positive outcomes for intrapreneurship (Antoncic, 2007). Intensive 
environmental scanning can highlight industry trends, external threats, and 
opportunities which are all important for intrapreneurial activities such as 
innovativeness and new business venturing (Zahra, 1991). For companies in hostile 
environments, scanning aimed at forecasting the industry environment can be very 
important. Organizational support may be considered the most crucial antecedent of 
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intrapreneurship (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2003; Antoncic and Hisrich, 2000). 
Organizations can support their employees through training programs and such 
support can usually improve organizational performance. Other types of 
organizational support include top management support, management involvement, 
commitment, style, staffing, work discretion, time availability, loose intra-
organizational boundaries, and rewards for new venture activities (Antoncic, 2007).   
 
In addition, Kanter (1984) suggests that a combination of emotional and value 
commitment can improve the level of innovativeness in organizations. Values are an 
important component of an innovative organizational culture, in which employees are 
continuously encouraged to generate new ideas, knowledge, and solutions (Wong, 
2005). According to Guth and Ginsberg (1990), values-related drivers of 
intrapreneurship include the characteristics, beliefs, and visions of strategic leaders. 
Organizational values can be individual-centered (focus on how employees are 
treated in the organization) or competition-centered (focus on approaches 
organizational members should follow when attempting to achieve organizational 
goals) (Zahra, 1991). Antoncic (2007) found that organizational characteristics 
(communication amount and quality, formal controls, environmental scanning 
intensity, organizational support, competition-related, and person-related 
organizational values) had a positive impact on intrapreneurship. 
 
2.4 Risk control  
 
On the surface, risk control and corporate entrepreneurship may seem to be at odds. 
While corporate entrepreneurship is aimed at taking the organization in new 
directions, risk control is aimed at channeling and often restricting actions (Goodale, 
Kuratko, Hornsby, and Covin, 2010:1). An organization‘s control for risk would seem 
to be a deterrent to the freedoms needed to successfully promote innovation 
behaviour within the organization; after all, risk control exists to counteract the 
adverse effects of uncertainty on the organizational system while ensuring the 
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conformity to established routines. Without risk control and other operations control 
mechanisms, organizations that manifest corporate entrepreneurship may tend to 
generate a disjointed mass of interesting but unrelated opportunities that may have 
profit potential, but do not move the organization toward a desirable future (Goodale 
et al, 2010). Contrary to this view, Gilley, Walters, and Olson (2002) found that risk-
taking had a positive effect on organizational performance.  
 
Implementing a corporate entrepreneurship strategy in an organization is quite 
challenging due to the failure to appreciate how risk control and other operations 
control variables work in conjunction with organizational antecedents of corporate 
entrepreneurship to facilitate innovation performance (Goodale et al, 2010). 
However, if innovation-focused controls are enacted by management at the strategy 
levels of the organization, the positive impact that entrepreneurial activity has on 
organizational performance may be suppressed. This is because such controls often 
lead to centralization of organizational structure and decision-making, hence limiting 
the latitude of action available to lower-level organizational members (Goodale et al, 
2010). Consistent with Morris, Allen, Schindehutte, and Avila (2006), the restriction 
of the number of entrepreneurial opportunities recognized and pursued may limit the 
capability of the organization to achieve its innovation objectives because the best 
opportunities may be systematically removed by the elements of organizational 
structure which limit individual discretion. 
 
The flip side of the coin is the decentralization of operational control mechanisms 
which will reduce the risk premiums of outcome–based incentives by helping to 
establish clear organizational boundaries for innovation behaviour and appropriately 
administering incentives that will promote the long-term innovation interests of the 
organization (Goodale et al, 2010). Such decentralization places the responsibility for 
action at the level of the individual employee and those employees on the front line 
of innovation are often most knowledgeable about where the organization‘s most 
attractive entrepreneurial opportunities lie and how they might be pursued. 
Innovation-focused controls designed and administered this way grant greater 
discretionary power to these potential intrapreneurs. 
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2.4.1 Risk control and corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The pursuit of innovative initiatives often involves an exposure to the possibility of 
outcomes involving loss (Goodale et al, 2010). Operational risk has been examined 
in a variety of ways in the literature (Goodale et al, 2010; Ellis, Henry, and Shockley, 
2010; Weiss and Maher, 2009). It has been demonstrated that organizations 
generally control risk through an emphasis on marketing tried-and-true products and 
services, adopting a ―wait-and-see‖ posture when immediate actions are not 
demanded, and choosing to incrementally deviate from past behaviour when new 
circumstances are encountered.  
 
Operations management research has often suggested that control systems can be 
instrumental to the successful introduction of new products and technologies (Das 
and Joshi, 2007, Naveh, 2007). Goodale et al (2010) studied the relationship 
between certain organizational antecedents and innovation performance and found 
that organizational boundaries and management support were positively related to 
innovation performance. The relationship between management support and 
innovation performance was found to be more positive under low than high levels of 
risk control. This is consistent with Zwikael and Sadeh (2007), who suggest that 
management endorsement of innovative initiatives can be a hurdle and thus any 
imposition of additional constraints via risk control may only serve to hamper 
success.  
 
Goodale et al (2010) also found that the relationship between organizational 
boundaries and innovation performance was more positive under high than low 
levels of risk control. This finding is contrary to that involving management support 
and thus suggests that individual operations control variables can have a diversity of 
effects on the organizational antecedents that promote innovation performance. 
Monsen, Patzelt, and Saxton (2009) used a conjoint field experiment to collect data 
and test how risk moderated an employee‘s decision to participate in a new 
corporate venture. They found that job and pay risk negatively moderated the 
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positive relationship between profit-sharing bonus and an individual employee‘s 
likelihood to participate in a new corporate venture such that this relationship was 
less positive when job risk and pay risk were high than when they were low. 
 
2.4.2 Risk control and compensation 
 
Reward systems that encourage innovation and risk-taking have been shown to 
have a strong effect on an employee‘s tendency to behave intrapreneurially (Block 
and Ornati, 1987:44). Kuratko et al (1990) identified reward and resource availability 
as a principal determinant of intrapreneurial behaviour by middle and first-level 
managers and a similar finding was reported in Hornsby et al (2002). Contrary to 
these findings, Goodale et al (2010) found no positive relationship between 
rewards/reinforcements and innovation performance in the data used for their study. 
 
The presence of incentives for innovative initiatives may best promote innovation 
performance when risk controls are emphasized. Innovative behaviours that are both 
rewarded and have been subjected to careful risk evaluation will likely gain higher 
ground within the organization.  Such rewards will support innovative initiatives that 
have been carefully judged to have an acceptable risk-return probability, the 
combination of which will likely result in high innovation performance outcomes. 
However, Goodale et al (2010) found no support for the notion that high levels of risk 
control make the relationship between rewards/reinforcements and innovation 
performance more positive. 
 
2.5 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
 
A general literature review on compensation, intrapreneurship, and risk control has 
been discussed above. The theoretical foundation of the proposed hypotheses is 
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positioned in the agency theory; hence a review of some important conceptual 
issues regarding the agency theory is now discussed. Nonetheless, it remains 
beyond the scope of this section to systematically delineate the entire reach of the 
agency theory. Other theoretical foundations that will be discussed in this section 
include the resource-based and expectancy theories. 
 
2.5.1 Resource-based theory 
 
The resource-based theory postulates that organizations are heterogeneous in terms 
of the resources they control and these resources include all the assets, capabilities, 
attributes, and knowledge an organization possesses which enable it to develop and 
implement strategies that improve its performance. Such resources are valuable, 
rare, difficult to imitate, and have qualities that make them irreplaceable (Barney, 
1991). An organization‘s resources can be a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage when it becomes difficult for the organization‘s competitors to obtain the 
same resources. Similarly, scarce resources create entry barriers for organizations 
that do not have them (Balkin et al, 2000). For example, a pharmaceutical 
organization that produces a new medication that is better than others in treating a 
serious illness will patent the medication and take legal action against those who 
infringe on the patent, thereby establishing entry barriers that make it more difficult 
for others to imitate the medication until the patent expires. This patent and the 
capability to make other innovative medications are examples of resources that may 
provide a competitive advantage to the organization.  
We live in a time where the external environment organizations operate in is facing 
great turbulence and therefore it is not enough to conduct business in a non-
aggressive manner (Morris, Kuratko, and Covin, 2008). Organizations that have the 
capability to innovate can be expected to generate greater profits than those that are 
non-innovators. Since success of compensation practices promotes innovative 
behaviour among employees, it becomes imperative for an organization to use its 
compensation practices as one of the tools to sustain its capability to innovate. 
Consequently, one will expect that organizations should link their compensation 
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practices to evidence of employees‘ efforts to innovate. At the same time that 
employees should be more compensated as their innovative efforts increase, it 
seems logical that as productivity from such innovative efforts increases, there 
should also be a matching increase in their compensation (Barney, 1991). 
Even though resource heterogeneity is the most basic condition of resource-based 
theory, it is not enough for sustainable advantage. For instance, if an organization 
has heterogeneous assets which can be easily imitated, such assets will only 
generate a short-term advantage (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). Thus, the other 
conditions suggested by the resource-based theory are important as well. 
Heterogeneous resources are a basic condition of entrepreneurship but the process 
by which these resources are discovered, turned from inputs into heterogeneous 
outputs, and exploited to extract greater profits, have been given little attention in the 
literature on strategy. Alvarez and Busenitz (2001:757) argue that entrepreneurship 
involves cognition, discovery, pursuing market opportunities, and coordinating 
knowledge that leads to heterogeneous outputs.  
 
2.5.1.1 Cognition in entrepreneurship 
 
Entrepreneurs are probably the most heterogeneous group in the population and 
they have been discussed more than any other group in the literature (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). An important area of discussion has focussed on their cognitive 
approaches which are likely to have strengths and weaknesses in various 
competitive environments and are a potential source of competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). To clarify how entrepreneurs think, Busenitz and Barney (1997) 
found that entrepreneurs used heuristics much more than managers in big 
organizations. Heuristics refers to the simplifying strategies that entrepreneurs use to 
make strategic decisions in situations of incomplete or uncertain information (Alvarez 
and Busenitz, 2001:758). Consequently, they think in a manner which leads to 
innovative ideas that are not always very linear and factually based. This is important 
for entrepreneurs because they find themselves in situations that tend to maximize 
the potential effect of various heuristics.  
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Heuristic-based logic enables entrepreneurs to quickly interpret uncertain and 
complex situations leading to forward-looking approaches, perceiving new 
opportunities, faster learning, and innovations. Thus, entrepreneurial cognition can 
be a source of competitive advantage (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). When insights 
and decisions reached with heuristic-based logic are potentially valuable in the 
market, rare, difficult to imitate, and exploited by entrepreneurs, then these 
entrepreneurial insights and decisions are a resource that can potentially lead to a 
competitive advantage. Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) argue that those with an 
entrepreneurial cognition can enable a potential competitive advantage in at least 
two ways. The first is the discovery of new opportunities. Entrepreneurial cognition 
can help us better understand why some individuals see new opportunities where 
most others see either a benign environment or emerging threat. The second area 
involves the initial stages of organizational development. Entrepreneurial cognition 
can allow entrepreneurs to navigate through a wide array of problems and 
irregularities inherent in the initial stages of organizational development (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). 
 
2.5.1.2 Entrepreneurial discovery of new opportunities and heterogeneity 
 
One of the main reasons that fascinate people about entrepreneurs and their 
inventions seems to centre on why and how they see and create new opportunities 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001:759). An entrepreneurial opportunity involves the 
development of a new idea that, in most cases, others have overlooked or chosen 
not to pursue. This cognitive ability of entrepreneurs to visualize situations in an 
opportunistic manner is a heterogeneous resource that can be used to develop other 
resources.       
Two perspectives have been used to explain entrepreneurial discovery of 
opportunities (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). The first has to do with how information 
is searched, obtained, and used to lead to new inventions. The second has to do 
with the recognition process by which new discoveries are made.  From the search 
perspective, there seems to be two opposing suggestions from the literature. Some 
 56 
research suggests that discovery can be accurately modelled as a rational search 
process while others argue that the search for discovery cannot be accurately 
modelled as a rational search. In modeling discovery as a rational search, the 
assumption is that entrepreneurs know where the invention needs to be made and 
can accurately weight the cost and benefits of acquiring new information relevant to 
the invention. This implies that an extensive search is targeted in the direction where 
the discovery is to be made (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
 
The argument against discovery being modelled as a rational search has focussed 
on the process side of discovery. Kirzner (1979) cited in Alvarez and Busenitz 
(2001:760) developed the term ―entrepreneurial alertness‖ to back up this argument. 
Entrepreneurial alertness is the ability to see where products or services do not exist. 
Entrepreneurial alertness exists when an entrepreneur has flashes of superior insight 
into the value of a given resource when others do not, enabling him/her to recognize 
an opportunity when it presents itself.  
 
Kirzner (1979) cited in Alvarez and Busenitz (2001:760) argues that there is a 
significant difference between entrepreneurial alertness and the knowledge expert. 
The knowledge expert is unaware of the value of their knowledge or how to turn that 
knowledge into a profit. However, the entrepreneur can recognize the value and the 
opportunity of the expert‘s knowledge (for example, technological expertise) even 
though he or she may not have the specific knowledge of the expert (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). With regards to entrepreneurs, specialized knowledge is often 
knowledge about opportunities created by the environment or a new product or even 
the opportunities of a potential new product. While the entrepreneur may possess 
this specialized knowledge, it is the tacit generalized knowledge of how to organize 
and use specialized knowledge that is the entrepreneur‘s main intangible resource 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).    
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2.5.1.3 Recognising market opportunities and heterogeneity 
 
Some debate in the field of entrepreneurship has focused on whether or not the 
perfect competition model can be used to explain entrepreneurial behaviour (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). However, it is also important to pay special attention to 
the conditions under which entrepreneurial opportunities can be most efficiently 
realized through both market and non-market forms of exchanges (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001:760). Entrepreneurs can either use market forms of governance or 
they can use an organization as a form of hierarchical governance to coordinate 
many resources which are necessary to realize an economic opportunity. Since 
these forms of exchanges carry costs, it becomes important for the entrepreneur to 
know when it is less costly to use one form of exchange over the other (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001).  
 
The types of resources and capabilities that require specific investment in order for 
their full economic value to be realized have been identified by resource-based logic. 
These include resources and capabilities that are socially complex, path dependent, 
and tacit (Barney, 1991). When the realization of the economic value associated with 
an entrepreneurial opportunity depends on the use of the above mentioned 
resources, it is more likely that an organization as a form of hierarchical governance 
will be used to realize this value as opposed to a non-hierarchical form of 
governance (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). These ideas suggest that entrepreneurial 
organizations are likely to arise in an economy in the presence of conditions that 
require the efficient coordination and integration of knowledge. 
 
Schumpeter (1934) cited in Alvarez and Busenitz (2001:761) noted an important 
distinction between invention and innovation. Invention is the discovery of an 
opportunity while innovation is the exploitation of a profitable opportunity. This 
distinction sees the organization as a problem solving institution. As such, forming an 
organization is basically an entrepreneurial act because to coordinate and transmit 
tacit knowledge, the coordination of the organization is required. Thus, the 
 58 
entrepreneur‘s ability to transform creative insights and homogenous inputs into 
heterogeneous outputs makes the organization a superior choice over the market 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
 
Knowledge costs can be used to further support this notion. Knowledge is not free, 
and the fact that it differs across organizations lends a supporting hand to an 
organization‘s heterogeneity. Thus, the entrepreneur‘s coordination of specialized 
knowledge makes the heterogeneous organization a superior choice over the 
markets. Organizations are a bundle of commitments to technology, human 
resources, and processes all covered by knowledge that is specific to the 
organization. This bundle and how the entrepreneur coordinates it allows some 
organizations to be heterogeneous and such organizations are not easily altered or 
imitated (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
 
2.5.1.4 Coordination of specialized knowledge and heterogeneity 
 
Alvarez and Busenitz (2001:762) note that entrepreneurial specialized knowledge is 
the ability to take abstract information concerning where to obtain undervalued 
resources and how to use these resources. Such resources can be explicit and/or 
tacit. Entrepreneurship involves a combination of resources as entrepreneurs bundle 
old resources to produce new ones. Schumpeter suggested five situations where this 
phenomenon can occur. According to Schumpeter (1934:132) cited in Alvarez and 
Busenitz (2001:762), the entrepreneur revolutionizes the pattern of production by 
exploiting an invention or an untried technology, by opening up a new source of 
supply of materials or a new outlet for products, or by reorganizing an industry. 
 
Most recent discussion on opportunity discovery has focussed on markets, both 
factor and product markets. However, once the discussion turns to factor markets 
(and thus production which involves the creation of value through the transformation 
of inputs into outputs) there arises a need for the coordination of different types of 
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specialized knowledge (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). The important word in this 
discussion is coordination. Knowledge can either be tacit which is personal and more 
difficult to communicate or interpret, or it can be explicit such as technology. Without 
coordination, however, knowledge is often dispersed, fragmented, and sometimes 
even contradictory. The entrepreneurial challenge is how to utilize resources to 
obtain a profit, suggesting that entrepreneurial knowledge is mainly an abstract 
knowledge of where and how to obtain resources (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
 
Therefore, when the market fails to organize distributed knowledge, the entrepreneur 
turns to the opportunity resulting in a new organization (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
While markets are often inefficient at knowledge transfer and integration, the primary 
role of the organization is to integrate specialized knowledge. Markets are inefficient 
at integrating knowledge mainly because explicit knowledge can be imitated with 
ease and tacit knowledge by definition cannot be articulated. Since tacit knowledge 
can‘t be articulated, transferring it becomes an impossible task (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001). 
 
2.5.2 Expectancy theory 
 
The importance of preferred compensation practices for enhancing desired 
employees‘ behaviour can also be examined through the lens of the expectancy 
theory. This theory assumes that employees‘ effort and performance are related to 
their expectations. This means employees act in ways that they believe will result in 
rewards of some importance to them such as higher earnings (Lerner et al, 2009). 
This also suggests that managers can positively influence their employees by 
making pay contingent upon performance. Lerner et al (2009) noted that 
compensation practices should include procedures for influencing an employee‘s 
work, appraising their performance, and compensating them. Yanadori and Marler 
(2006) note that compensation practices can be connected to strategic objectives by 
defining the critical employee groups and choosing an appropriate policy for internal 
structure, mix of compensation types, and basis for pay increases. In sum, according 
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to the expectancy theory, entrepreneurial employees who believe that their efforts 
will result in outcomes that reward them appropriately will remain committed to the 
entrepreneurial goals set for them within the organization (Lerner et al, 2009). 
 
Generally speaking, the expectancy theory is the dominant theoretical framework for 
explaining human motivation (Manolova, Brush, and Edelman, 2008:70). Expectancy 
theory uses three relationships to explain the concept of motivation: expectancy, 
valence, and instrumentality. Expectancy is the subjective probability that effort will 
lead to an outcome. Valence is the anticipated satisfaction that results bring and 
instrumentality describes the relationship between an outcome and another outcome 
(Vroom, 1964 cited in Manolova et al, 2008). In the field of entrepreneurship, the 
expectancy framework has been used in many empirical studies. For example, 
Shaver, Gartner, Crosby, Bakalarova, and Gatewood (2001) found that 
entrepreneurs who believed in their skills and ability were motivated to put in the 
required effort in pursuing their goals.  
 
Manolova et al (2008) conceptualized new venture creation as a process based on 
an effort-performance-outcome model. This suggests that the effort used to start a 
new business (performance) leads to a certain desired outcome. Interpreting this 
model using the expectancy theory implies that starting the new venture (first-level 
outcome) will lead to the following desired outcomes: self-realization, status, financial 
success, and autonomy (Manolova et al, 2008:71). This is consistent with findings 
from Manolova et al (2008:78) which suggested that entrepreneurial expectancy was 
significantly and positively associated with the expectation that the launch of a new 
venture will lead to desired outcomes. This expectation was found to be significantly 
associated with the desired outcomes of self-realization, financial success, status, 
and autonomy. Their result lends support to the explanatory power of expectancy 
theory in examining entrepreneurial start-up motivations (Manolova et al, 2008). 
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2.5.3 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory is crucial, yet controversial. It has been used by scholars in many 
different fields which include accounting, economics, finance, political science, 
marketing, and organizational behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989:57). 
 
2.5.3.1 Origins of agency theory 
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, some economists (Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968 
cited in Eisenhardt, 1989:58) explored risk-sharing among individuals or groups and 
concluded that the risk sharing problem arises when cooperating parties have 
different attitudes toward risk. This concept of risk-sharing was broadened by the 
agency theory to include the agency problem which occurs when cooperating parties 
have different goals and division of labour. To be more specific, the agency theory 
looks at the agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to 
another (the agent), who does the work (Eisenhardt, 1989). In most cases, this 
agency relationship between the principal and the agent is governed by a contract. 
Two main problems occur in the agency relationship and agency theory tries to 
resolve these. 
 
The first agency problem arises when the goals of the principal and the agent conflict 
and at the same time it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor what the 
agent is doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). The second agency problem is that of risk sharing 
which arises mainly when the principal and agent have different risk preferences. 
Since a contract governs the principal-agent relationship, the agency theory seeks to 
use the assumptions about people (for example, self-interest), organizations (for 
example, goal conflict among employees), and information (for example, information 
is an asset which can be purchased) to determine the most efficient contract which 
can govern the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989:58). In this light, two 
choices exist: a behaviour-oriented contract (for example, salaries and hierarchical 
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governance) or an outcome-oriented contract (for example, commissions, stock 
options, and market governance). Table 3 gives an overview of the agency theory: 
 
Table 3: Agency theory overview (Eisenhardt, 1989:59) 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization 
of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human 
assumptions 
Self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the 
effectiveness criterion, information asymmetry between principal 
and agent 
Information 
assumptions 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting 
problems 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection), risk selection 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have pertly 
differing goals and risk preferences 9for example, 
compensation, regulation, leadership, impression management, 
whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
 
 
The agency theory took its roots from information economics and has developed 
along two streams since then – the positivist and the principal agent (Eisendhardt, 
2008). These two streams share common assumptions about people, organizations, 
and information. They also use the same unit of analysis (the contract between the 
principal and the agent). However, they differ in the level of their mathematical 
rigour, dependent variable, and style of application (Eisenhardt, 2008:59).  
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2.5.3.2 The positivist agency theory 
 
The main focus of positivist researchers is to identify situations in which the principal 
and agent have conflicting goals while explaining the governance mechanisms that 
limit the agent‘s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). Positivist research has 
mostly focussed on the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers 
of large public organizations and it also has a lower level of mathematical rigour than 
the principal-agent research. In establishing the positivist theory, three studies have 
been particularly influential: 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) cited in Eisenhardt (1989:59) studied the 
ownership structure of the organization including how share ownership by 
managers align managers‘ interests with those of shareholders. 
 Fama (1980) cited in Eisenhardt (1989:59) studied how efficient capital and 
labour markets could be used as information mechanisms to control the self-
serving behaviour of top-executives. 
 Fama and Jensen (1983) cited in Eisenhardt (1989:59) studied the role of the 
board of directors as an information system that the shareholders within large 
organizations could use to monitor the opportunism of top executives. 
 
Theoretically, the positivist research has focussed mostly on describing the 
governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem and two propositions have 
been used to capture these governance mechanisms. The first proposition is that 
outcome-based contracts can be used effectively to curb agent opportunism. This 
first proposition argues that outcome-based contracts align the preferences of agents 
with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the same 
actions, and thus, the agents are more likely to behave in the interests of the 
principals (Eisenhardt, 1989:60).  
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The second proposition states that information systems can be used to curb agent 
opportunism. Information systems inform the principal about what the agent is 
actually doing. This minimises the agent‘s chances of deceiving the principal, thus 
curbing agent opportunism. Positivist theory offers a more complex view of 
organizations although it has been criticised by both organizational theorists and 
micro-economists (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
2.5.3.3 Principal-agent stream of agency theory  
 
Principal-agent researchers focus on the general theory of the principal-agent 
relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal-agent paradigm is just like every formal 
theory – characterised by specified assumptions which are followed by logical 
deduction and mathematical proof. The positivist stream is more accessible to 
organizational scholars while the principal-agent theory is less accessible due to its 
abstract and mathematical nature. Despite this, the two streams are complementary. 
Positivist theory focuses on various contract alternatives while principal-agent theory 
indicates which contracts are most efficient under different levels of outcome 
uncertainty, risk aversion, and information (Eisenhardt, 1989:60).  
 
The principal-agent theory attempts to determine the optimal contract (behaviour 
versus outcome) between the principal and the agent. It uses a simple model with 
the following three assumptions: goal conflict between principal and agent, an easily 
measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk averse than the principal. Agents 
are more risk averse than principals because they are unable to diversify their 
employment while principals can diversify their investments. The approach of this 
simple model can be described using two cases. In the first case, the principal knows 
what the agent has done (complete information) while in the second case, the 
principal does not know what the agent has done. The second case can arise in a 
situation where the agent chooses his/her self-interest over that of the principal. The 
agent can behave in this manner when his/her goals are not aligned with those of the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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Two aspects of the agency theory are cited in the formal literature: moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). A moral hazard situation arises when the 
agent does not put forth the agreed-upon effort. For instance, a research scientist 
working on a personal research project during company time, but is undetected by 
management due to the complex nature of the research. An adverse selection 
occurs when the agent misrepresents his/her ability. The agent may claim to have 
certain skills during the hiring process which the principal cannot completely verify 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:61). Moral hazard and adverse selection confirms that the agent 
has unobservable behaviour, and in trying to solve this problem the principal has two 
options.  
 
One option is to use information systems, such as budgeting systems, reporting 
procedures, and additional layers of management to reveal the agent‘s behaviour to 
the principal.  The second option is to use an outcome-based contract which 
motivates behaviour by aligning the agent‘s preferences with those of the principal. 
However, an outcome-based contract has a cost in that it transfers risk to a risk 
averse agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The issue of risk arises because outcomes are not 
only influenced by the agent‘s behaviour; they are also influenced by government 
policies, economic climate, competitors, and technological change. It follows that 
outcome-based contracts are attractive when outcome uncertainty is low. As 
outcome uncertainty increases, it becomes more costly to shift risk to the agent. In 
summary, the main focus of the principal-agent theory is the trade-off between the 
cost of measuring behaviour and the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring 
the risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989:61). 
 
2.5.3.4 Hypotheses development 
 
To re-emphasize, agency theory postulates that the result of communications 
between a principal and an agent, in which the principal delegates work to the agent, 
is the essence of the relationships within organizations (Roth and O‘Donnell, 1996). 
The major problem identified by this theory is the incongruence that exists between 
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the goals of the principal and the agent, and the difficulty of monitoring the agent‘s 
behaviour. Goal incongruence results from the assumption that principals and agents 
are possibly pursuing different interests. A principal can, however, limit the agency 
problem by implementing desired incentives for an agent or by incurring monitoring 
costs (Lerner et al, 2009). Thus, the agency theory supports the argument that 
employees should be rewarded for evidence of innovation-related activities, 
independently of observed financial performance outcomes (Balkin et al, 2000).  
 
Agency theory emphasizes the risk attitudes of principals and agents (Barney and 
Hesterly, 1996) and helps provide a solution on how best to promote the innovative 
contributions of employees given the inherent uncertainty of the ultimate success of 
an innovation. Principals (executives) can diversify their shares over multiple 
organizations and thus are assumed to be risk-neutral while agents (employees) are 
assumed to be risk-averse because their employment security and income are tied 
to one organization. This risk differential as noted by Beatty and Zajac (1994) 
creates a conflict of interest between risk-neutral executives, who prefer that agents 
maximize organizational returns and risk-averse employees, who prefer to be 
conservative in their decisions to reduce their risk exposure.  
 
Emphasis on innovation implies a greater variability of outcomes and a greater 
probability of failure which leads to greater uncertainty and complexity (Balkin et al, 
2000). This implies risk-averse employees will be bearing greater risk if they engage 
in innovative behaviours and thus the challenge is to set up compensation practices 
that change the risk orientation of employees to align them with the interests of 
executives. For compensation practices to be effective in making an employee‘s risk 
orientation more consistent with that of executives, in this case encouraging 
employees to make risky investments in innovation, it is necessary to use a 
compensation criteria that employees can influence. Pay levels should be higher and 
part of total compensation should be based upon levels of innovative efforts rather 
than the outcomes of innovation such as increased profits (Balkin et al, 2000). 
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This leads to a fundamental argument in the agency and compensation literature in 
that, the performance of employees attracted to a compensation plan may increase 
in relation to the incentive intensity of rewards, measured as the variable portion of 
pay (Zenger and Marshall, 2000). Employees‘ marginal gains in income increases 
with higher incentive intensity of rewards and if increased effort has physical or 
psychological costs, employees will choose levels of effort such that the marginal 
gains from those efforts equals their marginal cost (Lerner et al, 2009). Therefore, 
pay plans which are more incentive intensive will drive employees to reach higher 
levels of effort and may also lure and keep talented employees (Zenger, 1994). 
 
Even though compensation practices play a vital role by providing an incentive for 
the agent to act on behalf of the principal, Jones and Butler (1992) claimed that such 
practices must be matched to structure in order to promote corporate 
entrepreneurship at all levels in the organization. Defining and controlling the 
principal and agent is the central issue in providing the incentives necessary for 
entrepreneurship. In order to solve the agency problem, the interests between the 
principal and the agent need to be aligned when the intrapreneur is the agent, not 
the principal. Focussing on typologies of compensation, the literature notes two 
types of rewards: contingent and non-contingent rewards (Lerner et al, 2009). 
Contingent rewards are based on the employee‘s or group‘s performance  level while 
non-contingent rewards are benefits flowing from affiliation with the organization or 
having a particular status in the organization. 
 
Individual risk-taking behaviour is important for entrepreneurship in existing 
organizations and the traditional approach to model individual risk-taking behaviour 
in corporate entrepreneurship is based on agency theory (Monsen et al, 2009). 
Without proper monitoring and control mechanisms, individual agents will minimize 
individual risk and maximize personal gain, even when it is not in the interest of the 
owners of the organization. For example, a manager (agent) might have the 
incentive to engage in risky decisions under the pretense of entrepreneurship, but 
not suffer the consequences of his or her poor decision making. Owing to such 
issues, the principal (organization) will want to monitor the agent‘s decision making. 
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One way to achieve this is to use operation‘s control mechanisms such as risk 
control to balance the interests of principals and agents in the successful pursuit of 
innovation via corporate entrepreneurship (Goodale et al, 2010). Sexton and Camp 
(1993) noted that equity is always important regardless of the incentive program 
designed. In general though, establishing equitable incentives to encourage 
corporate entrepreneurship is a difficult process (Jones and Butler, 1992). This is 
because the identity of principal and agent changes with respect to the 
entrepreneurial context, making it difficult to align their rewards with uncertainty and 
risk preferences (Lerner et al, 2000). This situation suggests that there could be 
barriers preventing the establishment and implementation of the desired 
compensation practices.  
 
Contingent compensation is important in most high-performance work systems and 
they include gain sharing, profit sharing, stock ownership, pay for skill, or various 
forms of individual or team incentives (Lerner et al, 2009).  The literature suggests 
that there is a contingency relationship between compensation practices that support 
innovation and the degree of uncertainty, that is, the need to encourage employees 
to accept risk is moderated by the degree of risk or uncertainty associated with 
innovation (Hayton, 2005). Based on the above discussion, three hypotheses are 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Actual compensation practices are positively related to employees’ 
elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. 
  
Hypothesis 2: Desired compensation practices are positively related to employees’ 
elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. Intrapreneurial employees prefer/desire outcome-
based compensation practices which refers to those which are directly linked to 
success of the intrapreneur’s idea/initiative/new venture; for example, options in new 
venture equity and variable bonuses for milestones achieved.  
 69 
Hypothesis 3: Department’s risk control moderates the relationship between desired 
compensation practices and employees’ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
An extensive review of studies examining compensation practices, intrapreneurship, 
and risk control was conducted. Different theoretical perspectives (resource-based, 
expectancy, and agency theories) on how compensation, innovation (intrapreneurial 
behaviour), and risk-taking interact with one another were debated. The agency 
theory was identified as the most relevant to this study. 
Based on the reviewed studies, it appears compensation is only one of the many 
factors that can elevate an employee‘s intrapreneurial behaviour. Other factors like 
the organization‘s strategy, culture, and industry can also impact an employee‘s 
intrapreneurial behaviour. The review also pointed out that organizations face certain 
problems when it comes to designing and implementing compensation practices. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This research was conducted as a quantitative empirical study with primary data 
sources, following a cross-sectional design. An attempt was made to determine 
possible links between the independent variables (actual compensation practices 
and desired compensation practices) and the dependent variable (elevated 
employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour); that is, how the independent variables 
(antecedents) and the dependent variable (consequent) are related, to the extent 
that a change in the independent variables are presumed an explanatory factor of 
the dependent variable. 
 
The researcher first examined the particular effect of the first two independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Subsequently, department‘s risk control was 
investigated as a moderator. The hypothesized relationships among study variables 
were schematically represented via independent and moderating effects as set out in 
Figure 1. 
 
The researcher had no ability to manipulate the variables under study but reported 
how these variables interacted with one another. The research design was therefore 
descriptive, ex-post facto, and correlational (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004).  
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of hypothesized relationships 
 
3.2 Literature review methodology  
 
A literature search was used to source articles used in the literature review section. 
Databases were selected according to their level of relevance to the topics under 
review. The following three electronic journal databases and platforms were 
extensively used: 
 JSTOR database; 
 EBSCO HOST (business source complete) database, and 
 ScienceDirect database. 
Actual 
compensation 
practices  
Employees‘ 
elevated 
intrapreneurial 
behaviour  
H1 (independent effect) 
Desired 
compensation 
practices  Employees‘ 
elevated 
intrapreneurial 
behaviour 
Desired 
compensation 
practices  
Employees‘ 
elevated 
intrapreneurial 
behaviour H3 (moderating effect) 
Department‘s risk 
control (DRC) 
H2 (independent effect) 
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The primary keywords used for search queries were: corporate entrepreneurship, 
intrapreneurship, intrapreneurial/entrepreneurial behaviour, compensation practices, 
agency theory, expectancy theory, resource-based theory, and human resource 
management practices. Reference sections of empirical studies were examined for 
studies that were not revealed through an electronic search. 
 
Amongst other journals, the following prestigious peer reviewed journals were 
consulted: 
 Academy of Management Journal; 
 Academy of Management Review; 
 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice; 
 Strategic Management Journal, and 
 Journal of Business Venturing. 
 
Usually, peer reviews address critical research methodology techniques such as 
sampling design, measurement instruments, and response strategies. 
 
3.3 Instrument design  
 
Items from existing measuring instruments were combined, modified, and expanded 
as required for this study. Besides the demographic and biographical measures, the 
instruments measured the following: 
 Actual compensation practices; 
 Desired compensation practices; 
 Current intrapreneurial behaviour; 
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 Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour, and 
 Department‘s risk control. 
 
Some of the existing items used in constructing the instruments for this study 
included: 
 Items previously used by Miller and Friesen (1982:24) to measure a firm‘s 
risk-taking/aversion propensity; 
 Items previously used by Block and Ornati (1987:50) to measure current and 
desired incentives for improved venture manager‘s performance, and 
 Items previously used by Pearce II, Kramer, and Robbins (1997) to measure 
entrepreneurial behaviour by managers, and some personal initiative items 
previously used by Frese, Fay, Hilburger, Leng, and Tag (1997). 
 
According to Grimm and Yarnold (1995), the main objective of any measuring 
instrument is to eliminate measurement errors and the problems associated with 
reliability or validity of the procedures used to measure the variables. 
 
 Cooper and Schindler (2008:289) use three major criteria to evaluate a 
measurement tool:  
 Validity: The extent to which an item measures what it is supposed to 
measure. 
 Reliability: This refers to consistency in measurement. Different measures of 
the same construct repeated over time should produce the same results. It is 
important to note that measures can be reliable without being valid, but 
cannot be valid without being reliable. 
 Practicality: This is concerned with the wide range of factors of economy, 
convenience, and interpretability. 
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With regards to validity, there is no technical way to evaluate the validity of a scale, 
but through principal component factor analysis, common factor analysis, and 
structural equation modeling, one can gain confidence in the validity of a scale by 
determining whether it has the relationships to other variables that are expected on 
theoretical grounds (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson, 2010).  
 
According to Treiman (2009: 244), the reliability of a scale can be measured through 
any of the following ways: 
 Test-retest reliability: It measures the correlation between scores of a scale 
administered at two points in time. 
 Alternate-forms reliability: It is the correlation between two different scales 
thought to measure the same underlying dimension. 
 Internal-consistency reliability: It is a function of the correlation among the 
items in a scale. Cronbach‘s alpha is the internal-consistency measure used 
in this study. 
 
With reference to economy (practicality), an online survey instrument was sent to 
671 respondents via the survey monkey website (www.surveymonkey.com). The 
completed survey instrument was also collected via the survey monkey website. This 
saved on travel and survey printing costs which would have been incurred had the 
researcher chosen hand-delivery of the survey instruments. The instrument also 
passed the convenience test because each section had clear instructions to the 
respondent. The researcher collected the completed questionnaires, analyzed the 
data, and interpreted the results. Issues of interpretability are thus irrelevant in this 
case. Interpretability is relevant when persons other than the researcher must 
interpret the results (Cooper and Schindler, 2008:295). 
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The questionnaire (Appendix 1) had close-ended questions and was divided into the 
following six sections: 
 Section A: Items concerning personal background (biographical 
questionnaire); 
 Section B: Items measuring actual compensation practices; 
 Section C: Items measuring desired compensation practices; 
 Section D: Items measuring employees‘ current intrapreneurial behaviour; 
 Section E: Items measuring employees‘ elevated intrapreneurial behaviour, 
and 
 Section F: Items measuring department‘s risk control. 
 
Response strategies included fixed sum scales and ratings using a five point Likert-
type scale. 
 
3.4 Sampling and data collection  
 
According to Mouton (2002:135), the term population and universe are always 
constructed entities within the context of a specific research project. After defining 
the targeted population, it must be made operational by constructing a sampling 
frame, from which the sample will be drawn. There are two primary kinds of samples 
which differ in the ways the elementary units are chosen: probability sample and 
non-probability sample (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004: 79).  
 
Due to time constraints, cost implications, and the difficulty of conducting a 
probability sample, a non-probability convenience sampling technique was used. 
This kind of sampling is the least reliable (Cooper and Schindler, 2008). Be that as it 
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may, the important issue about sampling in general, is not statistical but that of 
theoretical representativeness (Davidsson, 2004). 
 
Consistent with Monsen et al (2009:111), Monsen et al (2007:5), Amo and Kolvereid 
(2005:12), the sample for this research was composed of 671 corporate employees 
in the Master of Business Administration (MBA) or Postgraduate Diploma in 
Management (PDM) programme at the Graduate School of Business, University of 
the Witwatersrand situated in Johannesburg, South Africa. Only full time employees 
from entry to managerial level were required for this study. The email addresses of 
the respondents were sourced from various class-representatives of the MBA part-
time and PDM part-time classes for the years (2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011). The 
part-time class was used because it was composed of full time corporate employees 
who are likely targets for involvement in intrapreneurial activities.  
 
Based on the nature of the formulated hypotheses, a survey/questionnaire was 
designed and used to collect data. The research questionnaire was uploaded on the 
survey monkey website (www.surveymonkey.com) and sent to the 671 respondents. 
Data collection lasted four weeks, at the end of which 266 responses were received 
but 57 of those responses were discarded because they were incomplete. The 
response rate was 31.15%, as only 209 respondents completed the questionnaire.  
 
Some issues regarding ethical requirements were considered. Consent was 
formalized through a written agreement identifying the boundaries and extent of the 
permission to hand in questionnaires to participating employees. Full and open 
information (informed consent) was made available to respondents and based on 
this, some respondents voluntarily agreed to participate. No form of deception and 
misrepresentation was used to extract information from the respondents and their 
privacy and confidentiality was respected at all times.  
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Actual compensation practices was measured using a five-point Likert-type scale (17 
items) with anchors ―never‖ (=1) to ―very often‖ (=5).  Desired compensation 
practices was measured using a five-point Likert-type scale (17 items) with anchors 
―disagree strongly‖ (=1) to ―agree strongly‖ (=5). Current intrapreneurial behaviour 
was measured using a five-point Likert-type scale (18 items) with anchors ―disagree 
strongly‖ (=1) to ―agree strongly‖ (=5). Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour was 
measured using a five-point Likert-type scale (18 items) with anchors ―disagree 
strongly‖ (=1) to ―agree strongly‖ (=5). Department‘s risk control was measured using 
a five-point Likert-type scale (9 items) with anchors ―disagree strongly‖ (=1) to ―agree 
strongly‖ (=5). All the items for the above scales can be found in the research 
questionnaire (Appendix 1). 
 
3.5 Data analysis techniques 
 
Statistics was used in order to avoid superficial interpretations not suitable to 
qualitative analysis. In addition to using descriptive statistics and graphs, three main 
statistical tests were done: t-test for dependent/related groups, canonical analysis, 
and moderation analysis.  
 
3.5.1 T-test for dependent groups 
 
T-test for dependent groups is used when two groups of observations (that are to be 
compared) are based on the same sample of subjects who were tested twice. Two 
important conditions (normality and equality of variances) should be met before the t-
test can be used (Statsoft, 2011). In this study, each respondent was asked about 
the actual compensation practices (ACP) in their respective organizations and what 
they wanted as desired compensation practices (DCP). The t-test for dependent 
groups was conducted to find out whether a gap/difference exists between actual 
and desired compensation practices. The normality assumption was evaluated by 
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looking at the distributions of the ACP and DCP data via their respective histograms. 
The equality of variance assumption was verified using the F-test. These two 
assumptions were met and the sample size of N=209 was large enough (Statsoft, 
2011). 
 
3.5.2 Multivariate analysis approach 
 
Hypotheses one and two were tested using multivariate analysis. This method is 
often used when researchers need to relate one set of variables to other sets of 
variables or when it is necessary to represent a large data set by several, easy-to-
interpret variables (Lerner et al, 2009). With this method, the effects of key variables 
in one data set on all or several of the variables in the other sets can be easily 
identified. Several types of multivariate analyses exist and in the case of two or more 
data sets, canonical correlation analysis has been successfully used in previous 
research (Tishler, Dvir, Shenhar, and Lipovetsky, 1996). The researcher used 
canonical correlation analysis to test hypotheses one and two. A canonical analysis 
setup and notation is summarized in the next paragraph. 
 
Suppose that we are given two sets of data, each organized in a matrix, 
as follows: Xij, i = 1, . . . , k; j = 1, . . . ., n, and Yij, i = 1, . . . , k; j = 1, 
. . . ., m (Lerner et al, 2009:68). In the management field, each data set may include 
a group of specific variables describing various attributes of one organization or 
assessments of one individual. In this research, X represented data on 17 variables 
(n = 17) describing ACP (hypothesis one) and DCP (hypothesis two) of the 
organization, and Y represented 18 variables (m = 18) describing elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour (EEIB) of an employee.  
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3.5.3 Moderation analysis 
 
Moderation deals with a situation where the researcher thinks the strength of a given 
regression relationship (between an independent variable and dependent variable) is 
affected by the level of a third variable (the ―moderator‖) (Statsoft, 2011). A 
moderator often expresses the context of the chosen independent-dependent 
variable relationship. Certain relationships only operate under certain contexts; in 
fact, some relationships may be negative under certain contexts but positive in 
others. Thus, moderation can therefore express something of the processes behind 
relationships, and also explain why ―main effects‖ (independent-dependent variable 
slopes) are not always as strong as we expect (Statsoft, 2011). 
 
Moderation is evaluated through interaction, that is, the moderator variable interacts 
with the independent variable in affecting the dependent variable. The independent 
variable was desired compensation practices and the moderator was department‘s 
risk control (DRC). Risk was chosen as the moderator in this study based on the 
agency theory. In order to perform the moderation analysis, the ―interaction variable‖ 
was created by multiplying the desired compensation practices first canonical roots 
with the averages of risk control variables. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS  
 
4.1 Internal consistency reliability 
 
Internal-consistency reliability is a function of the correlation among the items in a 
scale and it is measured with Cronbach‘s alpha (Treiman, 2009). This reliability 
measure was chosen because Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha has the most utility for 
multi-item scales at the interval level of measurement (Cooper and Schindler, 1995). 
Generally, a value above 0.7 is considered adequate for internal consistency. 
However, Cortina (1993:103) showed that alpha can be greater than 0.7, in spite of 
low average item intercorrelations or multidimensionality, provided there were 
several items. The Cronbach‘s alphas of the scales in this research were as follows: 
 Actual compensation practices scale (α = 0.89); 
 Desired compensation practices scale (α = 0.89); 
 Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour scale (α = 0.89), and 
 Department‘s risk control scale (α = 0.79). 
 
Although Cronbach‘s alpha for actual and desired compensation practices have 
been listed, a closer look at these instruments revealed that they are not actually 
scales. Rather, they are instruments with a set of different compensation practices 
and as such it is unreasonable to measure internal consistency for such a measuring 
instrument. For example, opportunity for growth can be used as a standalone 
compensation practice. The same applies to job enrichment, options in new venture 
equity, and all the other compensation practices in the ACP and DCP scales. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The following major sample characteristics were noted: slightly over half (56%) of the 
respondents were males; 62% were in the 26-40 years age group; almost all (89%) 
were in the entry to managerial level group of employees;  very few (11%) were in 
the director to executive group of employees (this group, 22 respondents were 
omitted from the data analysis);  approximately three-quarters (78%) had spent five 
years or less in their current organization; approximately two-thirds (68%) were in 
industries other than manufacturing, information technology, and 
telecommunications (some of these other industries included banking, finance, 
mining, and retail), and approximately two-thirds (69%) were in companies with 151 
or more employees. These sample characteristics are depicted in Figures 2 to 7: 
 
Figure 2: Gender of respondents 
 82 
 
Figure 3: Age of respondents 
 
 
Figure 4: Job position 
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Figure 5: Years spent in current organization 
 
 
Figure 6: Organization‘s industry 
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Figure 7: Organization‘s size 
 
The five-point Likert-type scale items have approximately equal intervals. Thus 
metric statistics such as means, standard deviations, and parametric tests of 
significance were used, rather than adopting, for example, frequency analyses 
consistent with ordinal scales. The means for the ACP and DCP scales could not be 
calculated. A closer look at these instruments revealed that they were not actually 
scales. Rather, they were instruments with a set of different compensation practices. 
So it was unreasonable to calculate an average from the responses of such a scale. 
The means and standard deviations of the EEIB and DRC scales are depicted in 
Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 8 and 9. 
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Table 4: Means and standard deviations of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour scale 
Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour scale items (range from 1 to 5) Mean SD 
be unconcerned with danger 2.49 1.22 
act and then ask for approval 2.98 1.30 
expose myself to situations with uncertain outcomes 3.22 1.21 
go for the big win even when things could go wrong 3.31 1.20 
get proposed actions through bureaucratic red tape 3.59 1.20 
take risks in my job 3.59 1.08 
move ahead with a promising new approach 4.04 0.92 
attack pressing organizational problems 4.17 0.93 
devote a great deal of effort to selling my ideas 4.18 0.87 
change course of action 4.18 0.94 
get people to rally together to meet a challenge 4.25 0.93 
use opportunities to attain my goals 4.27 0.89 
show support for the good ideas of others 4.43 0.76 
search for a solution immediately 4.43 0.82 
display enthusiasm for acquiring skills 4.49 0.75 
take the initiative for my own ideas 4.49 0.73 
find ways to improve our products and services 4.49 0.75 
think about my work in new and stimulating ways 4.50 0.71 
 
 
Figure 8: Bar graph of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour means 
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Table 5: Means and standard deviation of risk control scale 
Risk control items Means SD 
use no borrowing or little borrowing 3.22 1.14 
encourage lesser level financial and personal risk-taking 3.24 1.18 
strong proclivity for low risk projects 3.38 1.17 
owing to nature of environment, it's best to explore it gradually 3.50 1.00 
avoid taking actions without research and planning 3.70 1.16 
assess risk factors to minimize uncertainty 3.83 1.06 
apply techniques and processes that have worked in other 
domains 
3.94 0.96 
 
 
Figure 9: Bar graph of department‘s risk control means 
 
The midpoint of the EEIB scale was 3. As shown in Table 4, scores below the 
midpoint suggested low intrapreneurial behaviour while scores above the midpoint 
suggested elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. Two scores (unconcerned with danger 
= 2.49, first act and then ask for approval = 2.98) were below the midpoint which 
suggested that employees were generally worried about danger and acting without 
approval when they engaged in innovative activities. All the other scores were above 
the midpoint and ranged from 3.22 to 4.5, suggesting that employees perceived that 
they will act intrapreneurially despite their concerns about danger and approval 
issues. 
 87 
The midpoint of the DRC scale was 3. As shown in Table 5, scores below the 
midpoint suggested risk maximization strategies and scores above the midpoint 
suggested risk minimization strategies. All the means were above the midpoint and 
ranged from 3.22 to 3.94. This suggested that employees generally believed that 
their departments implemented risk minimization strategies. 
 
4.3 Statistical test results 
 
4.3.1 Actual compensation practices versus desired compensation practices 
 
A t-test for dependent or related groups was performed to check for differences 
between actual and desired compensation practices. From Figure 10 and Table 6, it 
was evident that significant gaps existed between actual compensation practices and 
desired compensation practices for elevating intrapreneurial behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 10: Means of actual compensation practices versus desired compensation 
practices   
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Table 6: Actual and desired compensation practices for intrapreneurs (t-test 
dependent samples); Marked differences are significant at p < .0500, N = 209 
           
Compensation practices 
 
Actual compensation practices  Desired compensation practices 
  
           (Range from 1 to 5)   Mean SD t p Mean SD t p 
           
Variable bonuses based on ROI of 
new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
2.33 1.27 -15.65 0.000000 4.08 0.91 -15.65 0.000000 
           
Fixed bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
2.97 1.33 -9.86 0.000000 4.02 1.01 -9.86 0.000000 
           Options in parent company equity 2.10 1.30 -15.03 0.000000 3.82 1.07 -15.03 0.000000 
           Equity in parent company 2.03 1.18 -15.79 0.000000 3.80 1.09 -15.79 0.000000 
           Higher than normal salary 2.60 1.18 -14.77 0.000000 4.14 0.99 -14.77 0.000000 
           
Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
1.81 1.05 -21.76 0.000000 4.00 1.04 -21.76 0.000000 
           Options in new venture equity 1.81 1.01 -22.45 0.000000 4.00 0.94 -22.45 0.000000 
           
Variable bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
2.66 1.27 -15.09 0.000000 4.20 0.89 -15.09 0.000000 
           Accelerated promotion 
 
2.68 1.08 -15.43 0.000000 4.19 0.93 -15.43 0.000000 
           Motivation-based compensation 2.84 1.19 -12.22 0.000000 4.13 0.98 -12.22 0.000000 
           Job security 
  
3.39 1.13 -6.16 0.000000 3.99 1.09 -6.16 0.000000 
           Flexible work hours 
 
3.29 1.34 -7.63 0.000000 4.16 1.02 -7.63 0.000000 
           Opportunity for growth 
 
3.54 1.05 -11.07 0.000000 4.52 0.78 -11.07 0.000000 
           Job enrichment 
 
3.40 1.07 -10.67 0.000000 4.41 0.81 -10.67 0.000000 
           Praise and recognition 
 
3.50 1.04 -9.56 0.000000 4.39 0.95 -9.56 0.000000 
           Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 2.51 1.20 -6.85 0.000000 3.23 1.27 -6.85 0.000000 
           
Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or 
abroad 
1.94 1.20 -14.15 0.000000 3.36 1.30 -14.15 0.000000 
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Generally, all the compensation practices were preferred by employees to elevate 
intrapreneurial behaviour. However, most respondents believed that there was a 
large gap between actual and desired compensation practices. For example, the 
incidence of options in new venture equity was low (mean = 1.81), in contrast with its 
perceived desirability (mean = 4.00). 
 
4.3.2 Actual compensation practices versus elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 
 
To examine the relationship between ACP and EEIB (hypothesis 1), a canonical 
analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9. 
 
Table 7: Total redundancy for actual compensation practices versus elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour 
Canonical R: .58, p=0.00011, N=209 
 Actual  compensation practices 
(ACP), left set 
Elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour (EEIB), right set 
Number of variables 17 18 
Variance extracted 100.00% 96.96% 
Total redundancy 11.75% 9.89% 
 
Some definitions are necessary in order to understand canonical analysis. They 
include the following: 
 Canonical variates: Linear combinations that represent the optimally weighted 
sum of all the variables formed for both dependent and independent variables 
in each canonical function (Hair et al, 2010:236). 
 Canonical R: This is the canonical correlation coefficient and it measures the 
strength of the overall relationship between two canonical variates (for 
example, ACP and EEIB). 
 Canonical roots/eigenvalues: These are squared canonical correlation 
coefficients, which give an estimate of the amount of shared variance 
between the respective canonical variates. 
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 Variance extracted: This represents the amount of variance extracted from the 
variables in the respective set by all canonical roots.  
 Redundancy index: This is the amount of variance in a canonical variate 
(dependent or independent) explained by the other canonical variate in the 
canonical function (Hair et al, 2010:236). 
 
The overall canonical R (.58) was reasonably substantial (StatSoft, 2011) and highly 
significant (p < .0010). This value was the simple correlation between the weighted 
sum scores in each set of variables, with the weights pertaining to the first (and most 
significant) canonical root.  It is important to note that the maximum number of 
canonical roots that could be extracted was equal to the smallest number of 
variables in either set (Statsoft, 2011), thus, 17 canonical roots were extracted. All 17 
canonical roots extracted 100% of the variance from the left set (17 ACP items) and 
97% of the variance in the right set (EEIB items). The total redundancy for the ACP 
items was 11.75%, while that of the EEIB items was 9.98%.  This meant that based 
on all canonical roots and given the EEIB items, 11.75% of the variance in the ACP  
was accounted for, while given the ACP items, 9.89% of the variance in the EEIB  
was accounted for. These results revealed a very poor but significant latent root and 
suggested a very weak overall relationship between items in the two sets of 
variables. From the analysis, only the first canonical root was significant (Appendix 
2) and was thus examined further and the results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. The 
second root was statistically non-significant and was excluded from further analysis. 
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Table 8: Actual compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 
(canonical analysis, n = 209) 
              
Actual compensation practices Root 1 Elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 
  
Root 1 
    
  
     
  
Job security -0.02 
get proposed actions through bureaucratic 
red tape 
-0.02 
  
     
  
Higher than normal salary -0.04 take initiative for my own ideas 
 
-0.03 
  
     
  
Equity in parent company -0.10 Show support for the good ideas of others -0.04 
  
     
  
Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or abroad 
 
 
-0.11 
First act and then ask for approval, even 
when I know that will annoy other people 
-0.07 
  
     
  
Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
 
-0.12 
Get people to rally together to meet a 
challenge 
-0.07 
    
  
  
 
Search for a solution immediately 
something goes wrong 
-0.08 
Options in parent company equity -0.17 
  
     
  
Options in new venture equity -0.20 Often take risks in my job 
 
 
-0.17 
  
     
  
Flexible work hours -0.44 quickly change course of action when 
results are not being achieved 
-0.18 
  
 Accelerated promotion 0.02 
    
  
  
 
Actively attack pressing organizational 
problems 
-0.19 
Job enrichment 0.09 
    
  
  
 
Unconcerned with danger  
-0.31 
Fixed bonuses for milestone achievement 
0.11 
    
  
Boldly move ahead with a promising new 
approach when others might be more 
cautious 
-0.38 
  
 Praise and recognition 0.11 
    
  
  
 
Regularly go for the big win even when 
things could seriously go wrong 
0.04 
Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 0.21 
  
     
  
Motivation-based compensation 0.23 Willingly expose myself to situations with 
uncertain outcomes 
0.07 
  
 Opportunity for growth 0.23 
    
  
  
 
Think about my work in new and stimulating 
ways 
0.11 
Variable bonuses for milestone achievement 
 
 
 
0.24 
    
  
Find ways to improve our products and 
services 
0.13 
  
     
  
Variable bonuses based on ROI of new venture 
formed from the intrapreneur's idea 
 
 
0.26 
Use opportunities quickly in order to attain 
my goals 
0.14 
    
  
display an enthusiasm for acquiring skills 0.17 
  
     
  
    
Devote a great deal of effort to selling my 
ideas 
0.18 
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Table 9: Variance of root 1 extracted (proportions) 
Root factor Variance 
extracted 
(ACP) 
Redundancy 
(ACP) 
Variance 
extracted 
(EEIB) 
Redundancy 
(EEIB) 
Root 1 0.042929 0.014255 0.026032 0.008644 
 
 
The interpretation of the canonical factors followed a similar logic to that employed in 
factor analysis (Statsoft, 2011). The factor structures in Table 8 are also referred to 
as canonical loadings or structure coefficients. Nine items of the ACP variable 
revealed low loadings on the first canonical factor ranging from 0.02 to 0.26, while 
eight items had negative loadings; that is, they had a very low correlation with that 
factor. Seven items of the ACP variable revealed low loadings on the first canonical 
factor ranging from 0.04 to 0.18 while 11 items had negative loadings; that is, they 
had a very low correlation with that factor. From Table 9, the first canonical root 
extracted an average of 4% of the variance from the ACP items and an average of 
3% of the variance from the EEIB items. Given the EEIB items, the first canonical 
root accounted for about 1% of the variance in the ACP items (redundancy). Given 
the ACP items, the first canonical root accounted for about 0.9% of the variance in 
the EEIB items. The results in Tables 8 and 9 revealed that the set of items in the 
ACP variable were not predicting the set of items in the EEIB variable, thus 
hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
 
4.3.3 Desired compensation practices versus elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour 
 
To examine the relationship between DCP and EEIB (hypothesis 2), a canonical 
analysis was carried out. The results are shown in Tables 10, 11, and 12. 
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Table 10: Total redundancy for desired compensation practices versus elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour 
Canonical R:.70, p=0.0000, N=209 
 Desired  compensation 
practices (left set) 
Elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour (right set) 
Number of variables 17 18 
Variance extracted 100.00% 96.96% 
Total redundancy 21.08% 25.07% 
 
 
Compared to the canonical correlation results between ACP and EEIB, the results of 
the DCP and EEIB relation appeared to be stronger. The overall canonical R (.70) 
was quite substantial (StatSoft, 2011) and highly significant (p < .0010). This value 
was the simple correlation between the weighted sum scores in each set of 
variables, with the weights pertaining to the first (and most significant) canonical root. 
Seventeen canonical roots were extracted. All 17 canonical roots extracted 100% of 
the variance from the left set (17 DCP items) and 97% of the variance in the right set 
(EEIB items). The total redundancy for the DCP items was 21.08%, while that of the 
EEIB items was 25.07%.  This meant that based on all canonical roots and given the 
EEIB items, 21.08% of the variance in the DCP  was accounted for, while given the 
DCP items, 25.07% of the variance in the EEIB  was accounted for. These results 
revealed a poor but significant latent root and suggested a weak overall relationship 
between items in the two sets of variables. From the analysis, only the first canonical 
root was significant (Appendix 3) and thus, it was examined further and the results 
are shown in Tables 11 and 12. The second root was statistically non-significant and 
was excluded from further analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
Table 11: Desired compensation practices and elevated intrapreneurial behaviour 
(canonical analysis, n = 209) 
                  
Desired compensation 
practices  
Factor structure of root 1 
Elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour   
Factor structure of root 1 
      
  
  
  
    
  
Higher than normal salary 0.15 First act and then ask for approval, 
even when I know that will annoy other 
people 
0.1 
  
   Equity in parent company 0.18 
    
  
  
   
Unconcerned with danger  
0.16 
Fixed bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
0.19 
    
  
Willingly expose myself to situations 
with uncertain outcomes 
0.19 
  
   
Weekend at a hotel in South 
Africa or abroad 
0.22     
  
get proposed actions through 
bureaucratic red tape 
0.28 
  
       
  
Dinner at a prestigious 
restaurant 0.26 Regularly go for the big win even when 
things could seriously go wrong 
0.33 
  
   
Variable bonuses based on ROI 
of new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
0.34 
   
 
  
Find ways to improve our products and 
services 
0.46 
   
 
  
  
   
Often take risks in my job 
 
 
0.51 
Options in new venture equity 0.36 
    
  
  
   
Boldly move ahead with a promising 
new approach when others might be 
more cautious 
0.53 
Job security 
  
0.38 
  
       
  
Options in parent company 
equity 0.46 
display an enthusiasm for acquiring 
skills 
0.54 
  
       
  
Equity in new venture formed 
from the intrapreneur's idea 
0.49 
Actively attack pressing organizational 
problems 
0.59 
    
  
  
   
Devote a great deal of effort to selling 
my ideas 
0.61 
Praise and recognition 
 
0.51 
    
  
  
   
quickly change course of action when 
results are not being achieved 
0.63 
Motivation-based compensation 0.52 
  
       
  
Flexible work hours 
 
0.53 
Think about my work in new and 
stimulating ways 
0.69 
  
       
  
Job enrichment 
 
0.53 
Show support for the good ideas of 
others 
0.73 
  
       
  
Variable bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
0.61 Search for a solution immediately 
something goes wrong 
0.76 
  
       
  
Accelerated promotion 
 
0.64 
Use opportunities quickly in order to 
attain my goals 
0.77 
  
       
  
Opportunity for growth 
 
0.71 take initiative for my own ideas 
 
0.78 
  
       
  
        
Get people to rally together to meet a 
challenge 
0.79 
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Table 12: Variance of root 1 extracted (proportions) 
Root factor Variance 
extracted 
(DCP) 
Redundancy 
(DCP) 
Variance 
extracted 
(EEIB) 
Redundancy 
(EEIB) 
Root 1 0.200597 0.099502 0.323595 0.160513 
 
 
The factor structures in Table 11 are also referred to as canonical loadings or 
structure coefficients. The items of the EEIB variable ranged from 0.1 to 0.79. The 12 
items with the highest loadings ranged from 0.51 to 0.79. Of these 12 items, 11 were 
items measuring innovation and proactiveness while one item measured risk. 
Therefore, innovation and proactiveness were good representatives of EEIB. The 
items of the DCP variable had loadings ranging from 0.15 to 0.71. The seven items 
with the highest loadings were praise and recognition, motivation-based 
compensation, flexible work hours, job enrichment, variable bonuses for milestone 
achievement, accelerated promotion, and opportunity for growth. These seven items 
correlated highly with that factor. Of these seven items, six were are all non-
monetary compensation practices, meaning the non-monetary compensation 
practices were the best predictors of the 11 items measuring innovation and 
proactiveness.  
 
From Table 12, the first canonical root extracted an average of 20% of the variance 
from the DCP items and an average of 32% of the variance from the EEIB items. 
Given the EEIB items, the first canonical root accounted for about 10% of the 
variance in the DCP items (redundancy). Given the DCP items, the first canonical 
root accounted for about 16% of the variance in the EEIB items. The results in 
Tables 10, 11, and 12 revealed that the significant canonical correlation (0.70) 
between the items in the two sets (based on the first canonical root) was probably 
the result of a relationship between non-monetary compensation practices, and 
innovation and proactiveness. The set of items in the DCP variable that best 
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predicted the 11 EEIB items on innovation and proactiveness were the non-monetary 
compensation practices. Thus, hypothesis two was not supported.  
 
4.3.4 Moderation analysis 
 
To examine the moderating effect of department‘s risk control on the DCP-EEIB 
relationship (hypothesis 3), a multiple regression was executed incorporating the 
interaction term of risk*DCP. The first canonical roots of DCP served as the 
independent variable while the first canonical root of EEIB served as the dependent 
variable. An interaction term was created for each respondent by multiplying the 
averages of the responses on the risk control scale with the corresponding first 
canonical roots of the DCP items. The results are shown in Table 13: 
 
Table 13: Regression summary for dependent variable (elevated intrapreneurial 
behaviour 1st canonical root) 
R = .71, R2 = .50, Adjusted R2 = .49, p < 0.0000, Std. Error of estimate: .71               
F (2,196) = 99.36 
N = 199 b* Std. Err. 
of  b* 
b Std. 
Err. of b 
t (196) p-value 
Intercept  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01687 
 
 
0.05129 
 
 
0.32888 
 
0.74260 
 
DCP (1st 
canonical 
root) 
 
1.12504 
 
0.25124 
 
1.12504 
 
0.25124 
 
4.47792 
 
0.00001 
Interaction 
term 
(risk*DCP) 
-0.42945 0.25124 -0.12631 0.07389 -1.70932 0.08896 
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Based on the above model, an R2 of 0.50 was obtained and the explained variance 
of this regression model was statistically significant (p<0.001). This model indicated 
that 50.34% of the variation in the dependent variable (EEIB) was attributable to 
variation across the desired compensation practices items. However, the 
moderation effect of risk control was not statistically significant when risk control 
was used as a moderator. The p-value for the regression model was not statistically 
significant (t (196) = -1.7093, p>0.05) and should thus be removed from the model. 
This suggested that risk control did moderate the DCP-EEIB relationship and 
therefore hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
 
In summary, the main findings of this research included the following: 
 Gaps existed between actual compensation practices and what employees 
perceive to be the desired compensation practices for elevating 
intrapreneurial behaviour. 
 Desired compensation practices (non-monetary compensation practices) were 
the best predictors of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour (innovation and 
proactiveness). 
 There was lack of sufficient evidence to conclude that departmental risk 
control moderated the relationship between DCP and EEIB. 
 
4.4 Study limitations 
 
The study limitations were as follows: 
 Due to cost and time-constraints, non-probability convenience sampling was 
used and with such a sampling method, it was not possible to assess 
sampling errors, nor was it possible to assess whether the sample was 
representative of the specific population. By using a non-probability 
convenience sampling technique, the more convenient elementary units were 
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chosen from the population for observation. This kind of sampling is the least 
reliable (Cooper and Schindler, 2008). 
 An organization is a micro-level unit of analysis made up of different 
individuals and business activities. As such, the issues of relevance, size, 
industry, size distributions, and heterogeneity need to be acknowledged 
(Davidsson, 2004). Also, Chandler et al (2000) note that each firm works in a 
different task environment making the relationship between innovation-
supportive cultures of organizations a difficult one to explore. The researcher 
did not control for the environment/industry given that respondents from 
organizations in many different industries were used. 
 This research was also prone to bias since the survey was self-reported. 
 This research attempted to predict the compensation practices that could 
elevate intrapreneurial behaviour, but usually, the prediction of attitudes or 
behaviours is generally weak because the correlations involving attitude 
scales are substantially attenuated due to unreliability (Treiman, 2009). 
 The researcher used canonical analysis. However, when the number of 
variables in one of the data sets is high (which was the case in this research), 
the weights obtained by canonical analysis may be unreliable (Lerner et al, 
2009). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
Previous studies suggest that compensation is an important component of the 
strategy of organizations wishing to promote entrepreneurship among their 
employees (Lerner et al, 2009; Chandler et al, 2000; Gautam and Verma, 1997; 
Hornsby et al, 1993; Block and Ornati, 1987). This research analyzed the role of 
compensation practices in elevating employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour in the 
various organizations under study. In addition, the moderating role of department‘s 
risk control on the DCP-EEIB relationship was also examined. The results revealed 
that organizations were not properly using desired compensation practices to 
elevate employees‘ intrapreneurial behaviour.  
 
The results clearly revealed that gaps existed between employee‘s perception of 
the desired compensation practices and the actual compensation practices existing 
in the various organizations. In addition, intrapreneurs preferred mostly non-
monetary compensation practices like job enrichment, opportunity for growth, 
flexible work hours, motivation-based compensation, and accelerated promotion. 
The main outcome-based compensation practice preferred by intrapreneurs was 
variable bonuses for milestones achievement.  
 
Lerner et al (2009:74) found that intrapreneurs preferred compensation practices 
related to both the internal venture‘s performance and their own performance 
(outcome-based compensation practices) while Jones and Butler (1992:744) state 
that outcome-based compensation practices are necessary to promote the bearing 
of uncertainty and reduction of opportunism. Consistent with agency theory, 
outcome-based compensation practices aligns the preferences of agents and 
principals because the rewards for both parties depend on the same actions. In 
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contrast, findings from this research indicated that intrapreneurs mostly preferred 
non-monetary compensation practices. Reasons for this inconsistency could be due 
to the research design used. Lerner et al (2009) focused their research on 
employees and managers of a large Israeli government-owned defense 
organization, employing over 2000 personnel in producing electronic systems. This 
research was conducted in South Africa whose employees have a different cultural 
setup from employees in Israel. Also, the researcher used employees from many 
different organizations operating in different industries and the survey instrument 
used by Lerner et al (2009) did not include the kind of non-monetary compensation 
practices used in this research.  
 
One of the reasons why employees preferred the non-monetary over the outcome-
based compensation practices could be because they felt that their organizations 
did not have the means, ability, or desire to compensate them in that manner. It 
could also be due to the fact that most organizations reserve outcome-based 
compensation practices for directors and executives who, for personal gains, might 
not be willing to share such benefits with floor level employees.  
 
Another important reason is found in the literature on strategy. Yanadori and Marler 
(2006) conducted a study on high-technology organizations and examined whether 
the organization‘s business strategy influenced its compensation systems. They 
found that the greater the emphasis on innovation, the higher the relative pay level 
of research and development employees compared to other employees. In other 
words, organizations with an innovation strategy in place will likely design outcome-
based compensation practices for employees who are involved in innovative 
activities. In addition, Amo and Kolvereid (2005:17) found that an organization‘s 
strategic orientation toward corporate entrepreneurship was significantly positively 
related to innovation behaviour. The current study did not examine the innovative 
strategy of the organizations under study and thus if most of these organizations do 
not have an innovation strategy, then outcome-based compensation practices might 
not form part of the compensation package for employees. In such a scenario, 
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employees will naturally prefer non-monetary compensation practices as this is 
what the organization might present to them. 
 
The results of this study are consistent with those of Monsen et al (2009:119) who 
found that getting employees to participate in a new venture was not just a matter of 
financial utility maximization. Non-outcome-based measures like pay risk, job risk, 
and expectations of success played a role in determining whether employees 
decided to be innovative or not. For example, the positive relationship between 
profit sharing bonus (outcome-based) and employees‘ participation in a new 
venture was negatively moderated by job risk and pay risk, and positively 
moderated by an employee‘s expectation of success in the new venture (Monsen et 
al, 2009). In other words, it is important for job risk and pay risk to be low when 
using profit sharing bonus to motivate employees to participate in a new venture. 
Job risk can be decreased through flexible work hours, opportunity for growth, and 
job enrichment. These items constituted the best predictors of elevated 
intrapreneurial behaviour in the current study. 
 
The current study found that opportunity for growth and job enrichment were good 
predictors of EEIB. These are two measures that can be attained through on-the- 
job training or external training arranged by the organization for its employees. This 
finding is consistent with Amo and Kolvereid (2005:17) who found that 
intrapreneurial personality was significantly positively associated with innovative 
behaviour, and thus it is important for organizations to train their employees in 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 
There is a mixed finding with regard to accelerated promotion. Accelerated 
promotion might bring more financial gain through higher salary, but if done often, 
the employee might climb up the organizational ladder too quickly without the 
necessary skills to occupy the new position. In this case, job risk might be increased 
and will negatively affect the employee‘s participation in innovative activities. This is 
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confirmed by Lerner et al (2009) who found that accelerated promotion was 
negatively correlated with the activities associated with intrapreneurial behaviour. In 
contrast, the current study found accelerated promotion to be one of the predictors 
of EEIB.  
 
Furthermore, Zenger and Lazzarini (2004) found that relative to large firms, small 
firms were more likely to have employees with a substantial percentage of their 
compensation explicitly paid as variable bonus. In contrast, the current study found 
that variable bonus for milestones achievement was also preferred by intrapreneurs 
in large organizations (69% of the respondents were from large organizations while 
only 17% were from small organizations). Of the outcome-based compensation 
practices examined in this study, variable bonuses for milestones achievement was 
the most important in predicting elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. This result is 
confirmed by some earlier research that examined high-technology reward systems. 
For example, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) found that technology managers, 
scientists, engineers, and other research and development employees were likely to 
have a portion of their pay contingent on the achievement of technology milestones. 
Regarding risk control, the researcher found that department‘s risk control did not 
moderate the DCP-EEIB relationship. This finding is consistent with Goodale et al. 
(2010) who found that the relationship between rewards and innovation 
performance was not affected by risk control. At the same time however, Goodale 
et al. (2010:9) found that risk control had a strong positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between organizational boundaries and innovation performance, but a 
strong negative moderating effect on the relationship between time availability and 
innovation performance. The theoretical implication is that desired compensation 
practices are not the only organizational antecedent that can elevate intrapreneurial 
behaviour. Other organizational antecedents like organizational support, 
organizational boundaries, and time availability are equally important to consider 
(Goodale et al, 2010). 
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5.2 Relevance of findings 
 
Generally, the variance of elevated intrapreneurial behaviour explained by desired 
compensation practices was very low, suggesting that desired compensation 
practices did not have much impact on elevated intrapreneurial behaviour. This 
finding suggests that it is not sufficient to use only compensation to elevate 
intrapreneurial behaviour. Rather, compensation systems should be an integral part 
of an overall entrepreneurial strategy of the organization. Therefore, any South 
African organization that wants to elevate their employees‘ intrapreneurial 
behaviour must be fully committed to corporate entrepreneurship at the strategy 
level of the organization.  
Numerous problems face organizations trying to link rewards to entrepreneurial 
performance.  Jones and Butler (1992:746) suggest that the ability of firms to align 
compensation to the changing conditions in the principal/agent relationship can 
prevent the intrapreneurial spirit from lapsing. The current results challenge South 
African organizations wishing to have intrapreneurial employees to place more 
emphasis on understanding what intrapreneurial employees really want rather than 
what they have in a compensation policy. 
 
5.3 Further research 
 
Chandler et al (2000) showed that the relationship between innovation-supportive 
culture of organizations and their implications is extremely complex to explore, as 
each organization works in a different task environment. In addition, research has 
suggested that compensation systems in high-technology organizations are distinct 
from those in other industries (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Therefore, in order to 
have a better understanding of the relationship between compensation and 
innovation, future studies should focus on a single industry. 
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Hayton (2005:25) suggests that the need to encourage risk averse employees to 
innovate is moderated by the degree of uncertainty associated with the environment. 
Department‘s risk control as used in this research is an operations control variable 
and might not be a good measure of environmental uncertainty. Future studies 
should focus on establishing an empirical measure of the level of uncertainty in the 
organization‘s industry and examine whether this moderates the compensation-
innovation relationship. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Research questionnaire 
Section A – Demographic information 
   
     Please place a cross (x) in the appropriate box to indicate your response 
  
1. Gender  
 
2. Age 
 
3. Current job 
position  
  
4. Highest 
educational 
qualification  
 
5.  Years spent 
in current job  
 
 
6. Years 
working in 
the company 
 
7. Number of 
times you 
have 
changed employer 
 
8. Which 
industry is 
your 
company 
operating 
in?  
 
9. Number of 
employees 
in your 
company   
Male Female 
25 years or 
younger 
26 - 40 years 41 - 55 years 56 years or older 
Manager Director Executive 
Other (please 
specify) 
________________ 
Matric 
qualification and 
below 
Certificate or 
diploma 
Undergraduate 
degree 
Postgraduate 
degree 
5 years or shorter 6 - 10 years 11 - 15 years 16 years or longer 
5 years or shorter 6 - 10 years 11 - 15 years 16 years or longer 
None Once Twice Thrice and above 
Manufacturing 
Information 
technology 
Telecommunications 
Other (please 
specify) 
________________ 
50 or fewer 51 to 100 101 to 150 151 or more 
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Section B - Actual Compensation Practices 
    
     
How often are the following compensation practices used to promote intrapreneurial behaviour in your 
company? 
 
 
      1. Variable bonuses based on ROI of new 
venture formed from the intrapreneur's 
idea 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
2. Fixed bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
3. Options in parent company equity 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
4. Equity in parent company 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
5. Higher than normal salary 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
6. Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
7. Options in new venture equity 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
8. Variable bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
9. Accelerated promotion 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
10. Motivation-based compensation 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
11. Job security 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
12. Flexible work hours 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
13. Opportunity for growth 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
14. Job enrichment 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
15. Praise and recognition 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
16. Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
17. Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or 
abroad 
Very 
often 
Often Sometimes Hardly ever Never 
 
     
      
      
 
 
 
 
   
 120 
Section C - Desired Compensation Practices 
 
     
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following practices of compensation 
should be used in order to promote intrapreneurial behaviour within your company. 
 
 
1. Variable bonuses based on ROI of new 
venture formed from the intrapreneur's 
idea 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
2. Fixed bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
3. Options in parent company equity 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
4. Equity in parent company 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
5. Higher than normal salary 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
6. Equity in new venture formed from the 
intrapreneur's idea 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
7. Options in new venture equity 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
8. Variable bonuses for milestone 
achievement 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
9. Accelerated promotion 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
10. Motivation-based compensation 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
11. Job security 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
12. Flexible work hours 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
13. Opportunity for growth 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
14. Job enrichment 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
15. Praise and recognition 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
16. Dinner at a prestigious restaurant 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
17. Weekend at a hotel in South Africa or 
abroad 
Disagre
e 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewha
t 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
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Section D: Current Intrapreneurial Behaviour 
  
 
   
  
To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements about your current 
intrapreneurial behaviour? 
 
     
1. I get proposed actions through 
bureaucratic red tape and into 
practice efficiently 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
2. I display an enthusiasm for 
acquiring skills 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
3. I quickly change course of action 
when results aren't being 
achieved 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
4. I take the initiative for my own 
ideas 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
5. I think about my work in new and 
stimulating ways 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
6. I find ways to improve our 
products and services 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
7. I show support for the good ideas 
of others 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
8. I boldly move ahead with a 
promising new approach when 
others might be more cautious 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
9. If large interests are at stake, I 
regularly go for the big win even 
when things could seriously go 
wrong 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
10. I get people to rally together to 
meet a challenge 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
11. I often take risks in my job 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
12. I first act and then ask for 
approval, even when I know that 
will annoy other people 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
13. I willingly expose myself to 
situations with uncertain 
outcomes 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
14. I am unconcerned with danger 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
15. I devote a great deal of effort to 
selling my ideas 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
16. I use opportunities quickly in 
order to attain my goals 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
17. I search for a solution 
immediately whenever something 
goes wrong 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
18. I actively attack pressing 
organizational problems 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
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Section E - Elevated Intrapreneurial Behaviour 
To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements about your 
intrapreneurial behaviour if the desired compensation practices were implemented by your 
company? 
 
1. I would get proposed actions through 
bureaucratic red tape and into practice 
efficiently 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
2. I would display an enthusiasm for 
acquiring skills 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
3. I would quickly change course of action 
when results aren't being achieved 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
4. I would take the initiative for my own 
ideas 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
5. I would think about my work in new and 
stimulating ways 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
6. I would find ways to improve our 
products and services 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
7. I would show support for the good ideas 
of others 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
8. I would boldly move ahead with a 
promising new approach when others 
might be more cautious 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
9. If large interests are at stake, I would 
regularly go for the big win even when 
things could seriously go wrong 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
10. I would get people to rally together to 
meet a challenge 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
11. I would often take risks in my job 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
12. I would first act and then ask for 
approval, even when I know that will 
annoy other people 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
13. I would willingly expose myself to 
situations with uncertain outcomes 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
14. I would be unconcerned with danger 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
15. I would devote a great deal of effort to 
selling my ideas 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
16. I would use opportunities quickly in 
order to attain my goals 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
17. I would search for a solution 
immediately whenever something goes 
wrong 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
18. I would actively attack pressing 
organizational problems 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
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Section F - Department's Risk 
Control 
      
        To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements about the risk control 
orientation of your department? 
 
1. In general, my department have a 
strong proclivity for low risk projects 
(with normal and certain rates of return) 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
2. In general, my department foster and 
encourage a lesser level of business, 
financial and personal risk-taking 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
3. In general, my department always 
research and assess risk factors in 
order to minimize uncertainty 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
4. In general, my department prefer to 
apply techniques and processes that 
have worked in other domains 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
5. In general, my department carefully 
manage risks and avoid taking actions 
without sufficient forethought, research 
and planning 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
6. In general, my department prefer to use 
no borrowing or little borrowing when 
investing in major projects 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
7. In general, my department believe that 
owing to the nature of the environment, 
it is  best to explore it gradually via 
cautious, incremental behaviour 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
8. When confronted with decision making 
situations involving uncertainty, my 
department typically adopts a cautious 
"wait and see" posture in order to 
minimize the probability of making costly 
decisions 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
9. In general, my department favour  a 
strong emphasis on the marketing of 
tried and true products and services 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
somewhat 
Undecided 
Agree  
somewhat 
Agree 
strongly 
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APPENDIX 2 
Chi-Square Tests with Successive Roots Removed (Hypothesis 1) 
Root  
removed 
Canonical - R 
Canonical - R-
sqr. 
Chi-sqr. df p 
Lambda - 
Prime 
0 0.576251 0.332065 406.4517 306 0.000112 0.112453 
1 0.551799 0.304482 331.3886 272 0.108249 0.168359 
2 0.538441 0.289918 263.8522 240 0.140018 0.242062 
3 0.446713 0.199553 200.1704 210 0.674883 0.340894 
4 0.398699 0.158961 158.7697 182 0.891639 0.425879 
5 0.373367 0.139403 126.5699 156 0.959274 0.506372 
6 0.351965 0.123880 98.6460 132 0.986487 0.588396 
7 0.307337 0.094456 74.0472 110 0.996573 0.671593 
8 0.282745 0.079945 55.5924 90 0.998345 0.741646 
9 0.235361 0.055395 40.0945 72 0.999157 0.806088 
10 0.209899 0.044058 29.4947 56 0.998642 0.853360 
11 0.183224 0.033571 21.1139 42 0.997027 0.892690 
12 0.170745 0.029154 14.7624 30 0.990999 0.923700 
13 0.153729 0.023633 9.2592 20 0.979689 0.951438 
14 0.127633 0.016290 4.8108 12 0.963991 0.974467 
15 0.095751 0.009168 1.7558 6 0.940726 0.990605 
16 0.015145 0.000229 0.0427 2 0.978891 0.999771 
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APPENDIX 3 
Chi-Square Tests with Successive Roots Removed (Hypothesis 1) 
Root  
removed 
Canonical - R 
Canonical - R-
sqr. 
Chi-sqr. df p 
Lambda - 
Prime 
0 0.576251 0.332065 406.4517 306 0.000112 0.112453 
1 0.551799 0.304482 331.3886 272 0.108249 0.168359 
2 0.538441 0.289918 263.8522 240 0.140018 0.242062 
3 0.446713 0.199553 200.1704 210 0.674883 0.340894 
4 0.398699 0.158961 158.7697 182 0.891639 0.425879 
5 0.373367 0.139403 126.5699 156 0.959274 0.506372 
6 0.351965 0.123880 98.6460 132 0.986487 0.588396 
7 0.307337 0.094456 74.0472 110 0.996573 0.671593 
8 0.282745 0.079945 55.5924 90 0.998345 0.741646 
9 0.235361 0.055395 40.0945 72 0.999157 0.806088 
10 0.209899 0.044058 29.4947 56 0.998642 0.853360 
11 0.183224 0.033571 21.1139 42 0.997027 0.892690 
12 0.170745 0.029154 14.7624 30 0.990999 0.923700 
13 0.153729 0.023633 9.2592 20 0.979689 0.951438 
14 0.127633 0.016290 4.8108 12 0.963991 0.974467 
15 0.095751 0.009168 1.7558 6 0.940726 0.990605 
16 0.015145 0.000229 0.0427 2 0.978891 0.999771 
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